



EXAMINING THE IMPEDIMENTS TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN WEST AFRICA: A STUDY OF THE ECOWAS INTERVENTIONS IN LIBERIA (1990) AND COTE D'IVOIRE (2010).

Emmanuel Ampomah (AMPEMM001)

A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Social Science in International Relations

Faculty of the Humanities
University of Cape Town

2019

Supervisor

Associate Professor John Akokpari

The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.

COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature: _____
Signed by candidate

Date: 22 July 2019 _____

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I owe a depth of gratitude to the underlisted individuals and organizations for their immense contributions towards my academic work and personal development:

To Associate Professor John Akokpari, thank you for the advice, support and guidance throughout the conceptualization and writing of this piece,

To the Mastercard Foundation, I am extremely grateful for your support throughout my academic journey at the University of Cape Town,

To my family, especially Ebenezer and Grace Ampomah, you ignite hope in me every day,

To Danielle Nkai, I can't thank you enough for your support and concern.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the ECOWAS Commission, for their relentless efforts towards making West Africa a haven for all.

List of acronyms

| | |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| AAFC | Allied Forces of the Community |
| ACS | American Colonisation Society |
| AFL | Armed Forces of Liberia |
| AU | African Union |
| CCR | Centre for Conflict Resolution |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration |
| ECOMOG | ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group |
| ECOWARN | ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| ECPF | ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework |
| EPP | ECOWAS Peace Plan |
| EU | European Union |
| FES | Friedrich Ebert Stiftung |
| IEC | Independent Electoral Commission |
| IFMC | Inter-Faith Mediation Committee |
| IGNU | Interim Government of National Unity |
| INPFL | Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia |
| MOJA | Movement for Justice in Africa |
| MSC | Mediation and Security Council |
| NPFL | National Patriotic Front of Liberia |
| OMC | Observation and Monitoring Centre |
| OPA | Ouagadougou Peace Agreement |
| PAL | Progressive Alliance of Liberia |
| PAPP | Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in the Côté d'Ivoire |
| PDCI | Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire |
| PKO | Peacekeeping Operation |
| PMAD | Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence |

| | |
|---------------|--------------------------------------------|
| PRC | People's Redemption Council |
| PSC | Peace and Security Council |
| RUF | Revolutionary United Front |
| SMC | Standing Mediation Committee |
| TWP | True Whig Party |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNOCI | United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire |
| UNOMIL | United Nations Mission in Liberia |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| COMPULSORY DECLARATION | II |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENT | III |
| DEDICATION | IV |
| LIST OF ACRONYMS | V |
| ABSTRACT | IX |
| CHAPTER ONE | 10 |
| 1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY | 11 |
| 1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS | 13 |
| 1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM | 14 |
| 1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY | 15 |
| 1.5 SIGNIFICANCE | 15 |
| 1.6 METHODOLOGY | 15 |
| 1.7 LIMITATIONS | 16 |
| 1.8 SCOPE OF THE STUDY | 16 |
| 1.9 ARRANGEMENT OF CHAPTERS | 16 |
| CHAPTER TWO | 18 |
| CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK | 18 |
| 2.1 INTRODUCTION | 18 |
| 2.2 CONFLICT | 18 |
| 2.3 DRIVERS OF CONFLICTS IN WEST AFRICA | 20 |
| 2.4 SECURITY REGIONALISM | 22 |
| 2.5 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT | 24 |
| 2.6 CONCLUSION | 29 |
| CHAPTER THREE | 30 |
| INSTITUTIONALIZING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN WEST AFRICA | 30 |
| 3.1 INTRODUCTION | 30 |
| 3.2 PROTOCOL ON NON-AGGRESSION (1978) | 30 |
| 3.3 PROTOCOL ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND DEFENCE, 1981 (PMAD) | 32 |
| 3.4 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT, RESOLUTION, PEACE-KEEPING AND SECURITY, 1999 (MECHANISM) | 35 |
| 3.5 ECOWAS PROTOCOL ON DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE, 2001 | 38 |
| 3.6 THE ECOWAS CONFLICT PREVENTION FRAMEWORK, 2008 (ECPF) | 39 |
| 3.7 CONCLUSION | 41 |
| CHAPTER FOUR | 42 |
| ECOWAS INTERVENTION IN THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1990-1997 | 42 |
| 4.1 INTRODUCTION | 42 |
| 4.2 BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT | 42 |
| 4.3 ECOWAS INTERVENTION | 44 |
| 4.3.1 RATIONALE BEHIND THE INTERVENTION | 45 |
| 4.3.1 LEGALITY OF THE INTERVENTION | 49 |
| 4.4 THE ECOWAS CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STRATEGY IN LIBERIA | 50 |

| | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 4.4.1 THE MILITARY APPROACH..... | 51 |
| 4.4.2 THE DIPLOMATIC APPROACH (PEACE-MAKING)..... | 55 |
| 4.5 CONCLUSION | 58 |
| CHAPTER FIVE | 59 |
| ECOWAS AND THE POST-ELECTION CRISIS IN COTE D’IVOIRE, 2010-2011..... | 59 |
| 5.1 INTRODUCTION..... | 59 |
| 5.2 BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT..... | 59 |
| 5.3 THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN THE CRISIS..... | 62 |
| 5.3.1 ECOWAS | 62 |
| 5.3.2 AFRICAN UNION..... | 63 |
| 5.3.3 UNITED NATIONS | 64 |
| 5.3.3 FRANCE..... | 65 |
| 5.4 THE ECOWAS CONFLICT MANAGEMENT APPROACH | 66 |
| 5.4.1 MILITARY INTERVENTION- DESIRABLE BUT IMPRACTICAL | 69 |
| 5.5 CONCLUSION | 71 |
| CHAPTER SIX..... | 72 |
| CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS | 72 |
| 6.1 INTRODUCTION..... | 72 |
| 6.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS..... | 72 |
| 6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY CONSIDERATION | 76 |
| 6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH..... | 78 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 79 |

ABSTRACT

Although established to promote economic integration in West Africa, ECOWAS has transformed into a regional security organization concerned with terminating conflicts in the sub-region. Accordingly, ECOWAS has militarily intervened in the numerous conflicts in the sub-region including the Liberian and Ivorian civil wars. The study notes that the fundamental causes of conflicts in the sub-region have not changed, although their dynamics have changed in many ways. Similarly, the approach of member states towards conflict resolution has changed remarkably with time, evidenced by the easing of the Anglo-Francophone tensions within the community. However, ECOWAS faces challenges in its conflict management role, including financial and logistical constraints, lack of consensus on the deployment of ECOMOG, lack of neutrality in peacekeeping operations, and its heavy reliance on Nigeria's leadership in interventions. These and other impediments have vitiated ECOWAS's capacity to swiftly intervene in conflict situations. The study concludes that, overcoming the challenges confronting it increases the capacity of ECOWAS to manage conflicts in the region.

CHAPTER ONE




Figure 1.1 shows the geographical map of West Africa (source: <http://www.tdrp.net/ECOWAS.php> accessed: 28/05/2019)

1.1 Background to the study

Post-colonial Africa was confronted with socio-economic, political and cultural hurdles emanating from the legacies of imperialism. With states lacking the capacity to champion economic transformation and development, multi-lateral cooperation, promoted through the formation of regional economic groupings became a viable alternative approach to dealing with the problems of development in Africa. Initial efforts at promoting 'Third World regional integration' were unsuccessful, largely due to the inability of developing countries to sacrifice their national interest 'on the altar of regionalism' (Okolo, 1985: 2). It was within this context that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established.

Prior to the formation of ECOWAS, the collective land mass referred to as West Africa was comprised of an amalgamation of 16 independent states, with each country having a unique colonial experience which subsequently defined the borders of the region (ECOWAS, 2016). The diversity within West Africa is evidenced by the hundreds of local languages spoken across the region. This is in addition to the official languages imposed by the colonizers- English, French and Portuguese (ibid). This, however, did not deter West African states from embarking on the ambitious project of regional integration.

In view of this, the 1975 Treaty of Lagos, signed by 16 West African States resulted in the creation of ECOWAS, with the aim of integrating countries within the sub-region (Atuobi, 2010). With several commonalities in history and culture, such an undertaking was not only possible but also prudent. The bloc was geared towards promoting interstate economic and political cooperation. This in effect, was aimed at accelerating the economic and social development of member states (ECOWAS, 2018). The organization was also established with the view of enhancing cultural and social cooperation among member states. Also, the pioneers of ECOWAS sought to increase and maintain economic stability in West Africa, as a strategic approach towards contributing to the 'progress and development of the African continent' (Lagos Treaty, 1975: 2).

The founding fathers of the organization were however oblivious of the interconnectedness of peace and development. Hence, the treaty did not envision a role for ECOWAS in the maintenance of regional peace and security. Neither did it make provision for mitigating potential interstate and intrastate conflicts. Sooner than expected, interstate disputes prevalent within the community, as well as the resurgence of external threats, culminated in the adoption of two security related protocols- the Protocol on Non- Aggression (1978) and the Protocol on

Mutual Assistance and Defense (1981) (Ekiyor, 2008). This marked a digression in the trajectory of the organization.

However, the post-cold war era changed the dynamics of conflicts on the African continent (Adeniji, 1997). It was within this epoch that the organization came to the realization that its objective of promoting economic integration would be unattainable considering the surge in violent intrastate conflicts within member states. In the 1990's, scholars portrayed the sub-region as emerging into a new theatre of violent civil wars in Africa (Francis, 2017). In his famous article, 'The Coming Anarchy', Robert D. Kaplan describes the situation in West Africa in a rather horrendous manner, asserting that the sub-region was evolving into a 'symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress' (Kaplan, 1994: 3). Although the postulation of Kaplan and other 'dooms day' scholars was an exaggeration of the reality, yet it portrayed to some extent the level of degeneration of security in the sub-region, as evidenced in the crisis in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau.

These internal conflicts not only posed a threat to countries within the community but also to regional peace and security (Adebajo, 2002). As such, as a way of safeguarding its initial goal of economic integration, ECOWAS assumed the role of a vibrant security actor in the sub-region through its first military intervention in the Liberian civil war. The intervention in Liberia significantly influenced ECOWAS' conception of security in West Africa. At the onset of the mayhem, the sub-regional body anticipated a firm response from the international community (Kennedy, 2018). This however turned-out to be an illusion. The bold decision taken by ECOWAS to intervene in the civil war therefore marked a paradigm shift from the universally accepted Westphalia model of international relations which upholds the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states (Osiander, 2001). Nonetheless, the organization was able to stabilize the turbulence in Liberia amidst the many challenges it encountered.

During this period, the bloc recognized the need for institutional reform to enhance its capacity to deal with the emerging political and security challenges it was confronted with. Subsequently, despite the initial silence of the Lagos Treaty on security related matters, the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993 contained provisions that rendered the organization responsible for the maintenance of regional peace and stability. Article 58(2) of the treaty states "... Member States undertake to co-operate with the Community in establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-State

and inter-State conflicts... in a bid to consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region”. (ECOWAS, 1993). Member states of the community went on to adopt the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security in 1999 (Atuobi, 2010). This protocol forms the framework which underpins the regional organizations peace and security engagements. Currently, ECOWAS has a well institutionalized and robust conflict management framework.

Notwithstanding efforts of the bloc at ensuring human security, the 2010 Ivorian elections resulted in another round of hostilities (Novosseloff, 2018). Although wearied by the many conflicts it had intervened in prior to this period, ECOWAS played an active role in resolving the conflict. With well-established institutional structures, the approach of ECOWAS towards the second Ivorian civil war varied from its earlier intervention in Liberia.

Generally, there exist two schools of thoughts with regards to the capacity of ECOWAS to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in the region. Whereas some scholars contend that the regional organization has failed, perhaps almost completely in resolving the many security challenges the sub-region is confronted with, other scholars posit that the organization has been successful in managing conflicts within the sub-region despite the many challenges (Adebajo, 2002 ; Ani & Amusan, 2016; Gberie, 2003). Proponents of the former view assert that, by focusing on its initial vision of promoting economic integration, ECOWAS can prevent the occurrence of conflicts. This thesis is however aligned with the later school of thought. In view of this stance, the study will be concerned with analysing the challenges encountered by ECOWAS in its interventions.

1.2 Research Questions

The research seeks to answer the following questions:

1. What challenges stifled ECOWAS’ conflict management strategies in the Liberian (1990) and Ivorian crisis (2010)?
2. What contributions did the institutionalization of the ECOWAS security architecture make on the organizations conflict management in Cote d’Ivoire?
3. Were there any similarities or discrepancies in the challenges encountered by ECOWAS in both conflicts?

1.3 Statement of The Problem

Conflict prevention, management and resolution has emerged as a crucial component of ECOWAS' vision of promoting socio-economic development in West Africa (Mareike, 2015). With time, the regional bloc has undertaken several diplomatic and military interventions in the sub-region including in Liberia (1990), Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea Bissau (1998), Cote d'Ivoire (2002) Togo (2005), Cote d'Ivoire (2010), Guinea-Bissau (2012), Mali (2013), and Gambia (2017) (Africa, 2018). Although the region has been relatively stable since the beginning of the 21st century, ECOWAS' contribution towards this has not been without challenges. The recent upsurge in insurgencies and the undue interference of the military in politics in Guinea-Bissau, Gambia and Mali have necessitated the need for a tentative research to be carried out in appraising the challenges crippling the efforts of ECOWAS in managing conflicts in the sub-region. The study will therefore be focused on the challenges faced by ECOWAS in resolving the sub-regions first post-cold war conflict in Liberia as well as the region's first post-election conflict in Cote d'Ivoire.

The Nigerian-led ECOMOG intervention in Liberia was executed under very strained conditions both within Liberia and among member states of the community (Arowolo, 2015). Nothing within the history of ECOWAS had prepared the organization for its new role, hence, the intervention was stifled by many challenges (Adeleke, 1995). Although some of the challenges encountered were as a result of the unintended effects of the actions and inactions of the organization, yet, most of these challenges occurred due to the experimental nature of the intervention. Similarly, the intervention in Cote d'Ivoire was fraught with many challenges. However, unlike the intervention in Monrovia which merited little concern from the international community, the conflict in Yamoussoukro gained the attention of several international actors (Abatan, 2016).

Although ECOWAS was actively involved in resolving both conflicts, the conflicts occurred within different context. The Ivorian crisis occurred twenty years after the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. Again, the intervention in Liberia occurred in the absence of a well institutionalized conflict management framework by the organization. Contrary to this, the intervention in Ivory Coast occurred within a period where the organization had properly laid-out structures and institutions which guided the bloc's efforts in stabilizing the country. As such, the research aims at ascertaining the impediments ECOWAS has been confronted with overtime in its conflict management. The study revolves around the core argument that ECOWAS is capable of managing conflicts within West Africa. Howbeit, the organizations

conflict management is plagued by many challenges most of which keep recurring in all its interventions.

1.4 Objectives of the study

The research seeks to:

1. Examine the challenges faced by ECOWAS in its interventions in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire.
2. Find out the impact of institutional structures established after the Liberian civil war on the intervention in Cote d'Ivoire.
3. Ascertain the similarities and discrepancies in challenges faced by ECOWAS in both conflicts.
4. Make recommendations on how ECOWAS can improve on its conflict management in West Africa.

1.5 Significance

With the prioritization of peace and security by ECOWAS, there is the need for the bloc to develop a strong capacity to stabilize the sub-region. It is therefore relevant for the intervention of ECOWAS in past conflicts to be reassessed in a manner that emphasizes on the challenges faced by the organization and how best these challenges can be resolved. This research will therefore contribute towards aiding policy formulation in ECOWAS by illuminating the deficiencies in the organizations conflict management. Although the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia has been widely studied by academics, there has been little focus in the literature on the Ivorian intervention and the unique challenges that ECOWAS has been confronted with overtime. As such, this thesis will contribute significantly towards bringing a new perspective to understanding ECOWAS' conflict management capability by evaluating the challenges that occurred prior to the adoption of institutional structures by the organization vis-à-vis challenges occurring afterwards. The research will also add up to the existing literature on peace and security in West Africa.

1.6 Methodology

Qualitative methodology of research was employed in undertaking this study. Qualitative research as a methodological approach to understanding a phenomenon comprises different approaches. In order to expound the research questions, the case study method has been adopted for this thesis. As such, both primary and secondary data will be used. Primary data sourced for the purpose of the research includes all ECOWAS protocols, treaties, declarations

and frameworks relevant to the study. Secondary data sourced for the study includes books, academic journals, articles, publications by civil society organizations, occasional papers, and international news outlets. The research will also focus on ECOWAS' interventions in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire as case studies. The parameters for analysing the case study will include: the motivations for the intervention, the conflict management approach adopted by ECOWAS and the challenges emanating thereof.

1.7 Limitations

Due to the focus of the study, the research will not address in detail the role of other national and international actors in resolving the conflicts. Another limitation to the research is in relation to the limited availability of literature that comprehensively analyse the ECOWAS intervention in Cote d'Ivoire. The study is also limited as it focuses primarily on ECOWAS' interventions in two armed conflicts, hence neglecting the challenges encountered by the regional group in other areas of peace and security in the sub-region. This renders a generalization of the findings of the study difficult.

1.8 Scope of the study

The research is limited to the ECOWAS interventions in Liberia from August 1990 until 1997 and the post-election crisis in Ivory Coast from November 2010 until April 2011.

1.9 Arrangement of chapters

In order to examine the research questions, the thesis has been streamlined into six distinct but interrelated chapters. Chapter one explains the background to the study as well as the methodology to be used in gathering the data. The chapter also ascertains the objectives of the study, its significance to literature as well as the limitations of the study. The second chapter examines the conceptual framework underpinning the study. Concepts discussed includes conflict, security regionalism and conflict management. Chapter three critically analyses the institutionalization of conflict management in West Africa, spanning from peace and security related protocols, treaties and frameworks adopted from 1978 until 2008. This will provide a good basis for understanding the ECOWAS interventions as well as the challenges encountered by the regional organization. Chapter four sheds light on the historical antecedent as well as the circumstances precipitating the occurrence of the Liberian civil war. The chapter will also analyse the rationale behind ECOWAS' intervention, the legality of the intervention as well as challenges that impeded the organizations efficiency in terms of its military and diplomatic approaches. The fifth chapter traces the causes of the Ivorian civil war and explains the role of

external actors in the conflict. The chapter also evaluates why ECOWAS could not intervene militarily in the conflict and the challenges it encountered. Chapter six ties together all the issues discussed in the study and highlights some similarities and differences in the challenges encountered by the organization.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

There exists a wide array of academic literature on conflicts in Africa and particularly challenges encountered by sub-regional organizations in their pursuit of peace and stability. This chapter, however, focuses on exploring concepts relating to conflict management. As such, the four sections of the chapter will explain the following: conflict, drivers of conflict in Africa, security regionalism and conflict management. These concepts will form the basis for understanding the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

2.2 CONFLICT

Conflict is a common phenomenon in every human society. Throughout the history of humanity, conflicts have been employed as a tool for expressing people's dissatisfaction with prevailing social, economic, cultural and political systems. As such, the eruption of armed conflict within a state is an exemplification of the pursuit of divergent views and interest among various state and non-state actors (Kazanský, 2015). The irreconcilable disagreements that usually results in conflicts are of varying forms and may include social, economic, political, historical, cultural or ethnic discrepancies (Akpokpari, 2008).

Although scholars generally agree on the need to define conflict, yet, like other ambivalent concepts in the social sciences, it is seemingly impossible to have a universally accepted definition of the term (Melander, 2015). However, for the purpose of this thesis, some definitions of conflict will be explored. According to Lewis Coser, conflict can be defined as the “struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aims of the conflict groups are not only to gain the desired values, but also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivalry” (Oberschall, 1978: 291). In their view, Hocker and Wilmot perceive conflict as “an expressed struggle between at least two interdependent parties who perceive incompatible goals, scarce rewards, and interference from the other party as hindering the attainment of goals” (Nwosu, 2014: 31). Further, Krejčí explains conflict as “a situation, in which a certain group (tribe, ethnic group, ideological group or state)... is in a purposeful dispute with one or more groups...” (Kazanský, 2015: 3).

On his part, Bernard Mayer explains conflict using a three dimensional approach (Annan, 2014). With regards to this, conflict can be ascertained in terms of perception, feeling or action.

With reference to the perception dimension of conflict, Mayer postulates that conflict emanates from a firmly held belief that a group's interest, values, goals, and needs are antipathetic to that of others (ibid). This perception is usually translated into feelings expressed through a myriad of emotions such as 'fear, anger, bitterness, sadness, hopelessness and frustration' which culminates in conflicts. Due to people's perceptions and feelings, they take action which could be violent and destructive in nature (Mayer, 2000: 2).

Further, the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) (2008) explains conflict in terms of "the contradictions inherent in power relations and which manifest themselves in individual and group interactions with one another and with nature in the pursuit of limited resources or opportunities" (Ecowas, 2013: 10). As such, the framework perceives conflict as being a viable motor for transformation which may either have a positive or negative outcome. In view of this, conflicts can be creatively channelled to ensure "equity, progress and harmony or destructively transformed to engender acute insecurity" (ibid:10). That notwithstanding, most conflicts occurring in the world are violent and destructive.

It is, however, important for the purposes of this thesis for armed conflicts to be put into perspective. Armed conflict is defined in International Humanitarian Law as any conflict "which take place in the territory of a state, between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations" (ICRC, 2008). In view of this definition, a conflict situation may be classified as armed conflict provided belligerents to the war includes one or more non-state actors. Similarly, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program defines armed conflict as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory, where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year" (Melander, 2015:3).

From the above definitions, a common denominator that characterizes conflicts is the escalation of tension between groups. These tensions are birthed out of the unhealthy competition for power over state resources, contrasting values and the desire of a group of people to express their grievances and frustration through combat. It is therefore as a result of the incompatibility of these goals as well as the impossibility of achieving them concurrently that conflicts occur.

Armed conflicts can broadly be classified as either intra-state or inter state (Bugajski, 2011). Intra-state or domestic conflicts occurs within a state and usually has two or more warring

factions. Although, intra-state conflicts occur within the frontiers of the state, they have the capacity to spillover into neighbouring states. Very often, such conflicts are caused by deepening political divisions, high levels of inequality within a state and the failure of the state to meet its basic obligation of protecting its citizens (Kazanský, 2015). Compared to the other forms of conflicts, intra-state conflicts have been prevalent in Africa since the end of the cold war. As such, the international community has been preoccupied with finding solutions to these conflicts, due to the threat they pose to global peace and security. Consequently, this has resulted in a rise in interventionsit policies at both the global, regional and sub-regional levels (ibid). These conflicts are manifested through civil wars, ethnic conflicts and insurgency among others. Examples of such conflicts include the war in Somalia (2006-2009) and Burundi (1993-2005) (ibid). Interstate conflicts on the contrary occur as a result of contentions between states. (Oberschall, 1978). Examples include the Ethiopia- Eritrea war (1998-2000) and the Cameroon-Nigeria conflict (1977). These conflicts are usually underpinned by border disputes. However, inter-state conflicts have been declining since the end of the cold war.

2.3 Drivers of Conflicts in West Africa

Different reasons have been alluded in explaining the sources of instability in West Africa ranging from the domino effect of colonialism to the neo-patriarchal nature of politics in the region (Aremu, 2010). That notwithstanding, none of the individual causal factors can sufficiently and exhaustively explain the basis for conflicts in the sub-region. The complexity of conflicts in West Africa makes it impossible for a ‘single analytical approach’ to be adopted in explaining the roots of conflicts (Akpokpari, 2008). Moreover, it is seemingly impossible to come up with a clear-cut typology of conflicts in West Africa, partly due to the “multi-causal, multi-dimensional and inter-connected nature of most conflicts” within the sub-region (Omeje, 2010). Jackson (2008) argues that the underpinnings of bloodbath and terror in Africa is not wholly as a result of ethnicity or some irrational factors “but the usual suspects that fuel conflict and violence throughout the world - political and economic competition, the failings of government, the decision of oppressed communities to take matters into their own hands, and the meddling and self-interested stratagems of external powers” (Jackson, 2008). Yet, other scholars ascribe the causes of conflicts in the sub-region to competition for scarce natural resources (Alao, 2007).

Although conflicts are not always vicious, most of those experienced in West Africa are characterized by extreme savagery. The ramifications of these conflicts include refugee crisis, destruction of human life and properties, stifling of economic growth and development as well

as the destabilization of existing institutions of governance within the sub-region (Annan, 2014). Annan (2014) explains violent conflicts in the sub-region as emanating from either unconstitutional take-over of power by the military or insurrection. Although military coup d'états are often short-lived in the sub-region, however, insurrections have usually been prolonged and have had devastating effects.

The ECPF explains the factors that precipitate conflicts in terms of structural factors, accelerators and triggers (ECOWAS, 2013). The framework postulates that, the alteration of structural elements through the aggravation of conflict accelerators is the fundamental cause of human insecurity. By structural factors, the ECPF implies systemic variables influenced by several decades if not centuries of the sub-regions power relations with other entities at both the international, regional and local levels (ECOWAS, 2013). Other structural factors precipitating conflicts within the sub-region pertains to 'the fault-lines in the architecture of the post-colonial African state' and the vulnerability of the sub-region and the African continent to changes in the global system (ibid:10). Although a direct causal correlation may be difficult to establish between these factors and conflicts in West Africa, structural factors underpins some basic causes of conflicts such as poverty and economic inequalities within the sub-region. Conflict accelerators on the other hand pertains to the events and processes that continuously exacerbates the effects of structural factors. These include inter alia, the infringements of human rights, corruption, marginalization of minority groups and the oppressive use of a country's security machinery. Triggers on the other hand are unexpected events with the capacity to ignite accelerators which subsequently results in violent conflicts (ibid).

According to the UN Security Council's Special Report (2011), despite significant progress made in ensuring economic growth and the consolidation of peace in West Africa, the sub-region continues to be strained by deficiencies in democratic governance (UNSC, 2011). Whereas the gains from efficient democratic governance could have contributed towards attenuating violence in the sub-region, however, democracy is usually leveraged as a tool by political elites to alienate sections of the populace. Consequently, such actions by the ruling elites in the sub-region results in violence with perpetrators defending their actions on the grounds of exclusion and bad governance (UNSC, 2011). A case in point is the bloodbath that emerged as a result of the November 2010 elections in Cote d' Ivoire. Political elites in West Africa instrumentalise elections as a tool for reinforcing existing socio-economic challenges and ethnic tensions, hence plunging the already frail states within the community into violence.

Again, scholars assert that weak states in West Africa provide the impetus for conflicts in the region. The weakness of most states emanates from their inability to carefully deal with challenges arising from the creation of 'artificial boundaries' in Africa, hence, leading to the aggravation of ethnic tensions (Akpokpari, 2008:90). The British Cabinet Sub-Committee on Conflict Prevention in Africa asserts that, the collapse of states in West Africa rarely occurs unexpected, as state failure arises out of a long process "characterised by predatory government operating through coercion, corruption and personality politics to secure political power and control of resources" (Development, 2000). Most of the conflict-laden countries in West Africa have experienced prolonged periods of poor governance, flagrant corruption, high levels of unemployment and aggrieved youths, poor economic management and the stifling of political opposition (Aremu, 2010). As such, the mismanagement of scarce state resources has resulted in underdevelopment and the weakening of state institutions (Annan, 2014). With most West African states lacking the capacity to provide basic social services and the inability of states to monopolize the usage of force within their jurisdiction, violent conflicts have become inevitable in the sub-region (Jackson, 2008). Again, the flagrant disregard for human rights evidenced through the instrumentalization of state security agencies to molest political opponents and civilians, extrajudicial killings and the absence of rule of law influences conflicts within the sub-region (Bujra, 2002).

2.4 SECURITY REGIONALISM

The concept of security regionalism has been championed as a viable alternative approach to addressing global peace and security in the post-cold war era. Security regionalism refers to the marshalling of efforts and resources by regional entities to respond to common security challenges (Maiangwa, 2017). The UN Charter provides the framework that underpins the involvement of regional organizations in conflict management (ibid:105). Chapter VIII, Article 52 of the charter states inter alia that the UN does not "prohibit the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations" (UN, 2016).

Towards the end of the 20th century, the US and the West disengaged their involvement in conflicts in some regions of the world. As such, it became imperative for regional organizations to assume the arduous task of generating solutions to security challenges and managing post-cold war conflicts which were in ascendancy in parts of the world, especially in Africa (Abatan,

2016). Regardless of the increasing demand for external intervention in conflicts, the UN and the US have been lax in taking complete responsibility for addressing regional crises, as they seek to propagate regional solutions to regional conflicts (Chuka, 2016).

This emerging phenomenon has been ascribed to the increasing demand on the international community to be involved in conflict management. Perhaps, this is as a result of the unending nature of conflicts in some regions in the world. Due to the enormity of these conflicts, UN troops dispatched to countries such as Somalia, Rwanda, Angola and Bosnia were adversely constrained. Hence, resulting in a 'string of failures and humiliation' (ICRC, 2008). Particularly, the fiasco in the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia in October 1993 resulted in the alteration of Western approach to conflicts in Africa (Chuka, 2016). The large-scale nature of these deployments resulted in significant constraints in the operations in terms of financing, timing and personnel. These challenges stifled the ability of the United Nations to ensure prompt and efficacious intervention measures (ibid). Hence, bringing to light the limitations of the UN to effectively intervene in all conflicts threatening global peace and security. It is against this background that the involvement of regional organizations in conflicts has become necessary.

Toward the end of the ideological antagonism between the two dominant global powers, there was an almost clear-cut delineation of the role of various actors in conflicts- especially between regional, sub-regional and international organizations (Rugumamu, 2002). Whereas the UN performed its traditional role of 'deploying political missions and peace keeping operations', regional and sub-regional organizations were much more involved in preventive diplomacy (ibid:5-6). This new approach to ensuring international peace made it necessary for regional and sub-regional organizations to take responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security within their jurisdiction, as a way of easing the 'burden' on the UN (Maiangwa, 2017). As such, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has adopted a selective approach towards conflict interventions. Significantly, this agenda is being championed by the US which is consistently seeking cooperation and burden sharing by all actors in the international community (ICRC,2008). In view of this, conflict resolution in Africa has first been the responsibility of the African Union (AU) and its sub-regional organizations rather than the international community.

Hwang (2006) explains security regionalism in terms of domestic, regional and extra regional levels. He postulates that the most serious security challenges in the Third World is usually at

the domestic level. Domestic conflicts usually have the potency of threatening regional peace and stability and usually attract the attention of the international community. This in turn results in external intervention in regional security crisis. As such, the success of security regionalism is dependent on the viability of individual states that make up regional groups. That notwithstanding, regional organizations contribute immensely towards peace and security at the domestic level. At the regional level, conflicts are usually addressed by member states of regional groupings in their bid to search for a collective regional identity that thrives on 'politico-security regionalism' (Hwang, 2006). This results in the evolution of a regional security structure that is not only material but also ideological. At the extra-regional level, the goal of security regionalism is to serve as a counter-balancing mechanism to address security concerns that emanates from beyond the region. As such, at this level, security regionalism seeks to protect member states from threats arising from external states and organizations.

Further, Hettne (2008) argues that the end of the cold war and the consequent rise of globalization has resulted in a new world order that goes beyond national sovereignty. In this regard, solutions to security challenges must be found in transnational structures. In view of this, conflict management is gradually getting internationalized either at the regional or global level. With domestic crises posing a threat to regional security, the traditional dichotomy between the domestic and international has been blurred (Hettne, 2008). As such, human rights violations and internal security challenges that states are confronted with usually take on a global outlook as the international community gets concerned about the consequences of such threats on the international system be it at the regional or global level. Security regionalism is therefore crucial in the maintenance of regional and global peace.

2.5 Conflict Management

Conflict management comprises a range of actions designed purposely to enhance the prevention, alleviation and resolution of conflicts (Chuka, 2016). It also constitutes a variety of interventionist efforts towards mitigating the dire impact of ongoing conflicts (ibid). A quintessential challenge to regional conflict management is the inability of these organizations to independently carry out operations without the support and involvement of a 'regional hegemon' (Jimoh, 2014). Also, the prevalence of internal rivalries among member states of regional organizations adversely affects regional conflict management efforts (ibid). This does not only stifle attempts at managing conflicts but also numbs 'attempts at a collective action by regional organizations' (Chuka, 2016). Further, the lack of resources in terms of finance, troops and logistics impedes the effectiveness of regional organizations in conflict resolution.

Conflict management is premised on four fundamental concepts: peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peace-making and peace-enforcement. These will be the focus of the preceding sub-sections.

2.5.1 Peace-making

Peace-making as an instrument of conflict management involves the use of diplomacy in fostering dialogue among leaders of conflicting parties in an attempt to broker peace, through representative political institutions (Domke, G & Solon, J, 2018). Former UN Secretary General, Boutros-Boutros Ghali (1992), defines peace-making as an “action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations”. Diplomatic and judicial measures provided for peace-making in the UN Charter includes inter alia, ‘negotiations, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement’ (UN, 1945).

Negotiations carried out as part of the peace-making process are usually undertaken by international statesmen such as heads of states, the UN Secretary General, envoys, governments, group of states or other diplomats representing the UN or a regional or sub-regional organization. This process is geared towards promoting dialogue as a way of reaching a favourable consensus which will abrogate hostilities among warring factions. Peace-making may also be carried out by non-governmental groups (UN, 2008). Although, peace-making is only applicable to ongoing conflicts, nonetheless, it does not require the use of force as it is premised on diplomatic dialogue (Adeleke, 1995). Such initiatives are usually implemented prior to the dispatching of a peace-keeping mission. Peace-making becomes necessary in conflicts characterized by a breach of international humanitarian law. With belligerents to these conflicts usually taking intransigent postures, there is the need for neutral external mediators to be involved in finding a political solution to such crisis (Ouellet, 2003). Also, peace-making efforts are usually aimed at achieving a peace agreement. This implies that a successful peace-making initiative must include all parties to a conflict.

2.5.2 Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping operation (PKO) is an approach to conflict management employed to prevent conflicts from surging, in order to create a conducive environment for the political settlement of disagreements (UN, 2018). In his report, “An agenda for peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peacebuilding” the former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali defined peacekeeping as involving “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well” (Ghali, 1992:13). Patryk

Labuda (2015) further defines peacekeeping as “measures aimed at preventing a breach of the peace or maintaining and restoring peace, which are carried out with the authorization of the United Nations or other international or regional organizations” (Labuda, 2015). PKO’s therefore involve ‘the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states through the medium of third-party intervention, organized and directed internationally... to restore and maintain peace’ (International Peace Academy, 1984:7).

These operations are aimed at preserving peace no matter how frail as well as aiding in the implementation of agreements arrived at by peacemakers. Most international peacekeeping operations are ad hoc and are usually comprised of troops from contributing countries (ibid). With time, the structure of peacekeeping operations has evolved from being a fundamentally military model of monitoring cease-fire agreements and separating warring factions into an intricate model with many dimensions- military, police and civilian- working hand in hand to help ‘lay the foundations for sustainable peace’ (UN, 2008:18). Peacekeeping therefore can be categorised into two- military observer missions and the broader peacekeeping force.

Military observer missions comprise unarmed troops dispatched into conflict areas with the responsibility of overseeing and monitoring the halting of hostilities, after factions to a conflict have conceded to a cease-fire agreement (UN, 2016). As such, traditional peacekeeping operation is a temporary conflict management strategy and is not very much concerned with political efforts at settling conflicts. On the other hand, broader peacekeeping operations usually comprise military or para-military operations with an extensive peacekeeping mandate (ibid). Usually made up of thousands of armed military personnel, such operations are tasked with the responsibility of creating buffer zones to separate the various factions (Ghali, 1992). These operations also assist and ensure the withdrawal of combatants from territories they unduly occupied during the conflict (Rugumamu, 2002). Extensive peacekeeping strategies are geared towards building trust among belligerents. This is because, the presence of a peacekeeping mission reassures factions to a conflict that their ‘contender’ will not leverage cease-fire agreements to gain undue military advantage.

Beside this, multi-faceted peacekeeping operations usually take up temporarily legislative and administrative roles in conflicted states as a way of aiding the transfer of power from one group to another (UN, 2008). Such operations may also contribute towards the establishment of new administrative structures and may as part of their mandate provide “operational support to national law enforcement agencies; provide security at key government installations, ports and

other vital infrastructure, establish the necessary security conditions for the free flow of people, goods and relief items and provide humanitarian assistance.” (UN, 2008:23)

Peacekeeping operations, whether conducted by the UN or any other regional organization requires that the mission has an explicit and precise mandate that guides its actions on the ground (Labuda, 2015). Generally, the mandate of peacekeeping operations are hinged on the principles of neutrality, consent of the various factions involved in the conflict and the non-use of force by peacekeepers except in instances of self-defence or defence of the mission’s mandate (Rugumamu, 2002). Also, the mandate of peacekeeping missions are designed in view of the availability of resources to support the missions operations. Importantly, PKO’s require a wide array of skills and expertise in fields such as ‘mediation, negotiation and liaison’ (ibid).

2.5.3 Peace Enforcement

With time, peace enforcement has become a crucial component of conflict management, due to the difficulties that arise with peacekeeping operations. Especially in instances where there is no peace to keep, hence, necessitating the need for the intervention force to first create the needed peace. Unlike the other conflict management mechanisms, peace enforcement entail the active usage of military force and other coercive measures as a means to resolving conflicts (UN, 2016). The usage of force in peace enforcement is not necessarily towards self-defence of troops as in peace keeping missions where force is only used as the last resort. In this case, the application of force is a strategic approach used as a ‘bargaining chip’ to ensure adherence to ceasefire agreements (Labuda, 2015). Such measures are usually imposed on conflicting parties by the UN Security Council, after the council determines that an ongoing conflict poses a threat to international peace and security. However, the implementation of such coercive measures is usually carried out by a group of countries or regional and sub-regional organizations (UN, 2018). Inter alia, peace-enforcement initiatives include military interventions, sanctions and blockades (ibid).

More often, the application of force in peace enforcement is intended to compel belligerents to cease-fire and to create a secured environment for civilians and aid workers. Unlike peacekeeping missions which require the consent of warring factions, a peace enforcement mission does not need the approval of belligerents (Nwosu, 2014). Consequently, such missions may not take into consideration state sovereignty especially in instances where the state is a party to the conflict and opposes the operation (ibid). In view of this, peace enforcement missions usually require international mandates in order to make their operations legitimate. Due to the nature of peace enforcement, the missions are usually equipped with full

range military capabilities, enough to match or supersede that of belligerents (Jackson, 2008). That notwithstanding, the ultimate aim of enforcement operations is to get the parties to a conflict to the negotiating table, hence such operations are usually constrained by political factors. As such, peace enforcement does not necessarily guarantee sustainable peace, neither does it seek to address the causal factors of the conflict. Rather, such initiatives only serve as a means through which peace can be attained (Domke, S & Solon, J 2018).

2.5.4 Peacebuilding

Lederach (2013) conceives peacebuilding as a “comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable peaceful relationships” (Lederach, 2013). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) further defines peacebuilding as involving attempts at establishing structures that address both ‘structural and proximate’ causes of conflicts and ‘delegitimize’ brutality as a mechanism for resolving disputes. It also involves enhancing the capacity of societies to peacefully deal with conflicts (Melander, 2015).

Post-conflict peacebuilding encompasses activities that predates the signing of peace accords. In view of this, peacebuilding initiatives are geared towards preventing countries from relapsing into conflict and also provides the platform for stability, economic and social development (Peacebuilding, 2013). Peacebuilding efforts therefore seek to augment conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-making and development strategies. These activities are often centred on consolidating existing peace by identifying and supporting structures that will improve human wellbeing in countries recovering from conflicts (ibid). Hence, the fundamental goal of peacebuilding is to achieve positive peace.

Further, peacebuilding involves a broad array of ‘physical, social and structural initiatives’ leading to capacity building, reconciliation, state building and social transformation in countries recovering from conflicts (Maiese, 2003). Such initiatives may include the demobilization and disarmament of combatants in a war, the restoration of democracy, law and order and repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons. It further extends to undertaking electoral, security sector, constitutional and judicial reforms and the establishment and strengthening of government institutions to enhance broader public participation in the governance process (Ghali, 1992).

In attempts to construct a new environment needed for sustained peace, post-conflict peacebuilding tackles social, humanitarian, economic and cultural problems that either

precipitated or are the effects of a conflict (ibid). Sustainable peace is only possible in an environment where structural and physical violence are absent, hence, necessitating the focus of peacebuilding efforts on resolving the root cause of conflicts (Omeje, 2010). As such, it is a long-term process initiated at the end of a conflict unlike other short-term conflict management mechanisms such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement which are implemented during conflicts. In view of its futuristic approach, peacebuilding initiatives carry the propensity to prevent future conflicts as it establishes alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (Peacebuilding, 2013).

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter explored the conceptual framework which underpins the study. Essentially, concepts examined includes conflicts, security regionalism and conflict management. With conflict management being a broad term, this thesis explains it in four dimensions: peacekeeping, peace building, peace-making and peace enforcement. These concepts are relevant in the examination of ECOWAS' conflict management in West Africa. The chapter also explained the drivers of conflicts in West Africa. The next chapter explores efforts at institutionalizing conflict management in West Africa.

CHAPTER THREE

INSTITUTIONALIZING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN WEST AFRICA

3.1 Introduction

As stated in chapter one, the rationale for the establishment of ECOWAS was to foster economic integration among West African states. However, over the years, the focus of the organization has expanded beyond championing development within the sub-region to addressing security concerns of member states. This chapter seeks to trace efforts at institutionalizing conflict management by ECOWAS. The chapter analyses treaties, protocols and frameworks adopted by ECOWAS in this regard. These will include the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978), Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence (1981), Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999); Protocol on Democracy and Good governance (2001), and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008).

3.2 Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978)

The adoption of the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) was precipitated by attacks on the territorial integrity of some ECOWAS member states. In the 1970s, two West African states became ‘victims’ of external aggression, hence necessitating the need for a regional ‘defence pact’ (Kabia, 2011). On 2 November 1970, Portuguese mercenaries, numbering about 350 attempted to invade Conakry (Guinea) in their efforts to take-over military camps and air strips. Although the invasion was foiled, a second invasion attempt was launched by the mercenaries. Despite the failure of the invasion attempts, the mercenaries successfully captured the Camayenne prison and subsequently released all political prisoners (Worldwide, 1970). Following the event, most African states, including Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, Senegal and Ivory Coast pledged to offer financial and military aid to help boost security in Guinea as a way of preventing any further attacks (Cowell, 2011). Although the allegation was denied by the Portuguese government, a UN mission dispatched to Guinea confirmed the involvement of an external power (Portugal) in the invasion, leading to a UN resolution condemning the attack (Worldwide, 1970). Similarly, Benin thwarted a mercenary attack on its territory in 1977. However, unlike the Guinea attacks, the perpetrators of the Benin ‘invasion’ were not identified. That notwithstanding, the President of Benin, Mathieu Kerekou, blamed Togo, Cote

D'Ivoire and Senegal (all member states of ECOWAS) for their involvement in the attacks (Adeniji, 1997). It is however worth noting that during the 1970's, imperial powers leveraged their relationship with some African countries to unduly interfere in the internal affairs of other newly independent states, hence, giving credence to the allegations.

Further, border disputes between West African states became increasingly bloody in the 1970's (Okolo, 1983). The border dispute between Mali and Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) for instance, resulted in several casualties. Also, in January 1976, Togo called for the 'adjustment of its frontiers with Ghana. Subsequently, the government of Ghana blamed Togo for supporting secessionist activities in the Volta region (Afolabi, 2016). In the same vein, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau disputed over their maritime border (ibid). These inter-state tensions and disputes carried the potency of escalating into violent conflicts within the sub-region.

In view of these emerging security challenges in the region, it became necessary for ECOWAS to redefine its role as a political actor in the community. Hence, the prioritization of the organization's efforts towards developing appropriate mechanisms to ensure regional peace and stability. This resulted in the adoption of the sub-regions' first security pact in 1978 by the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the highest decision-making body of the organization (Okolo, 1983). The Protocol on Non-Aggression was therefore geared towards augmenting the deficiency in the Treaty of Lagos.

Essentially, the protocol sought to refrain member states from employing 'threats or the use of force or aggression' in their relations with other sovereign states within the sub-region (Kabia, 2011). Again, the agreement sought to deter member states from either directly 'committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of other Member States' or allowing foreign residents or non-residents to perpetrate such activities using their territory (ECOWAS, 1978:3). As a way of consolidating existing stability, the protocol provided for the peaceful resolution of all disputes and established a minimal mechanism for resolving disagreements that member states lacked the capacity to resolve.

In its essence, most non-aggression treaties lack the capacity to dissuade the use of military offensive by states (Okolo, 1983). However, the adoption of the protocol was an important step by ECOWAS towards affirming its commitment of leveraging peace and security as a tool to promote economic development in West Africa. The adoption of the protocol also exemplified

the willingness of member states of the community and the goodwill of its leaders to constrain their sovereignty for the common good of the sub-region in terms of peace, security and defence. In view of this, the protocol provided a minimal basis of trust among member states of the community, especially between the Francophone states and Nigeria (Adeleke, 1995).

That notwithstanding, although the protocol recognized emerging security threats within the region, it lacked the needed rigour and mechanisms to either prevent the occurrence of conflicts or effectively resolve disputes when they arose. In this regard, the treaty was a mere utopia as it did not provide pragmatic means for achieving its objectives.

Also, the protocol did not provide for the establishment of adequate institutions to address conflicts. In anyway, the mechanism for resolving conflicts provided for in article 5 of the treaty was not established. However, even if established, the mechanism was wholly inadequate to tackle the complexities of the regional security climate at the time. The emerging security challenges within the region required a much more robust and proactive approach. Unfortunately, member states of the community lacked the political will to commit to this.

Again, the treaty failed to envision intra-state conflicts as a significant threat to regional stability. Prior to the adoption of the protocol, the most devastating internal conflict within West Africa had been the bloody three years civil war between the Nigerian government and the Biafra secessionist from 1967 until 1970. That notwithstanding, the framers of the treaty failed to recognize the impact of such civil wars on the sub-region's stability and the possibility of resurgence of such conflicts. Hence, the narrow focus of the treaty on inter-state wars and its absolute silence on domestic conflicts.

3.3 Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence, 1981 (PMAD)

Against the background of the inadequacy of the Protocol on Non-Aggression to prevent external aggression and the occurrence of internal conflicts, it became necessary for ECOWAS to revise its security strategy. As such, a proposal from the presidents of Senegal and Togo, for the adoption of another protocol on regional security was not only necessary but crucial in the determination of the capacity of ECOWAS to intervene in future conflicts. Subsequently, the Authority of Heads of States and Government adopted the PMAD in May 1981. Despite significant efforts made in the adoption of the protocol, it only came into force in September

1986. However, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Mali abstained from signing the document (Okolo, 1983).

The protocol called on member states of the community to make available mutual aid and support to safeguard countries within the sub-region from any form of armed threat or aggression (ECOWAS, 1986). The protocol further provided for conditions under which the regional organization could intervene in inter-state or intra-state conflicts. These conditions included the failure of states to recourse to peaceful means of resolving disputes. As well as the involvement of external entities in domestic conflicts of member states, with the capacity to destabilize the sub-region (Article 4, PMAD). In any such situations, the protocol legitimized intervention by ECOWAS either through military means or other diplomatic approaches such as mediation.

To facilitate the operationalization of the protocol, provision was made for the establishment of three institutions, namely, the Authority, Defence Council and Defence Commission. The Authority was mandated to determine the conditions under which military action would be expedient. Such decisions could only be warranted upon a written request by a member state for assistance from the regional organization. However, the protocol provided for such decisions to be implemented by the Allied Forces of the Community (AAFC). The AAFC served as the military wing of the organization and comprised of troops from member states. That notwithstanding, the AAFC could only be legitimately deployed in the event that the territorial integrity of a member state of the community was undermined. The Defence Council was however responsible for examining emergency situations in order to determine the most appropriate 'strategy to be adopted and the means of intervention to be used' (ECOWAS, 1986:5). The Defense Commission on the other hand was 'responsible for examining the technical aspect of defence matters' (Article 11, PMAD).

Compared to the previous protocol, the PMAD was a significant improvement and reaffirmed the commitment of leaders of the sub-region to maintaining peace and security. Despite this, the new protocol lacked the needed mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in the region. Like the Protocol on Non-Aggression, the PMAD focused more on curtailing external aggression rather than addressing the potential causes of conflicts such as the incessant coup d'états, malgovernance and the lack of respect for human rights, prevalent in the region at the time. Also, the pact was inapplicable to 'internal subversions' except for domestic conflicts that were externally motivated (ECOWAS, 1986). As such, the stipulation of

conditions for intervention by the protocol delineated legitimate basis for intervening in the domestic affairs of member states from unjustifiable ones, in order to protect the sovereignty of member states (Cowell, 2011). This phenomenon could however, be attributed to attempts by leaders of the bloc to preserve their regimes (Atuobi, 2010). Added to the above, the lack of unanimity among member states at the early stages of the drafting of the pact implied that the legitimacy of the document was in question. This became evident when there was a lack of consensus among member states of the organization on the role of ECOWAS in the Liberian civil war.

Further, the protocol appeared to have been a 'mere lip service' as institutions provided for by the document were never established. This was partly as a result of the old-age Franco-Anglophone contensions within the sub-region (Aning, 2004). With the Francophone countries suspicious of Nigeria's 'hegemonic ambitions', the organization could not marshal a common front to operationalize the protocol. This was further exacerbated by a provision in the protocol that called on member states to evacuate all foreign troops from their territory (Adeniji, 1997). With most of the Francophone states depending on France for assistance in defence and security, such provisions by the protocol was seemingly impossible to implement (Kabia, 2011). Further, prior to the adoption of the PMAD, the Francophone states in the sub-region had adopted the 'Accord de Non Aggression et d' Assistance en matiere de Defense' to resolve disputes arising among the former French colonies (Adeniji, 1997). By 1981, institutions to implement the provisions of the accord had been established including the secretriati. Similarly, Equatorial Guinea had stronger military ties with Spain while China had a military assistance entente with Mali and Guinea (Okolo, 1983). As such, the external relations of member states of the community as well as their commitment to other security agreements waned their loyalty to the PMAD.

Moreover, although the PMAD made room for the dispatch of a sub-regional military force, the AAFC was only an adhoc institution. In the absence of a standing army, swift military interventions to assist member states in the event of external aggression or internal conflicts was almost impossible to attain. Hence, defeating the purpose for which the protocol was adopted. Interestingly, the PMAD did not stipulate preventive measures to control the uprise of conflicts in the region, although at the time the protocol came into force, there had been signs that some countries in the sub-region were gradually headed towards conflict.

3.4 Protocol Relating to The Mechanism For Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security, 1999 (Mechanism)

A pivotal point in the consolidation of ECOWAS' security undertaking was the adoption of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty in 1993. Unlike the 1975 Lagos treaty that did not ascribe the responsibility of ensuring regional peace and stability to ECOWAS, the Revised Treaty recognized the challenges posed by civil wars and conflicts to peace and development in West Africa (Adeniji, 1997). Although previous efforts by the regional organization to secure the sub-region were useful, they could not prevent the outbreak of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars. As such, a robust approach towards preventing conflicts was needed to contain the rapid spread of violence within the region. In achieving this, member states of the community sought to address the root causes of conflicts in the sub-region. The approach to finding a lasting solution to conflicts in the region included the adoption of the Declaration of Political Principles by ECOWAS, revising of the ECOWAS treaty and the adoption of the Mechanism. In its essence, the Declaration of Political Principles of ECOWAS sought to reaffirm the commitment of member states of ECOWAS to the principles of rule of law and respect for fundamental human rights as well as democratic values, including citizens right to participate in the governance process (ECOWAS, 1991).

Article 58 (2) of the Revised Treaty stipulates the need for member states of the community to work effectively towards “establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflicts” within the region (ECOWAS, 1993). Among others, the revised treaty provides for the establishment of a regional ‘peace and security observation system’, as well as a peacekeeping force and reemphasizes the need to resort to peaceful means such as mediation, conciliation and good offices for the settlement of disputes (ibid) . Again, the treaty made room for the regional organization to render electoral support to member states in the form of election monitoring (Article 58(2g)). This marked a significant shift in ECOWAS' approach to conflicts, from merely reacting to crisis to conflict prevention. It is towards this end, that the Mechanism was adopted by the Authority of Heads of State and Government in 1999. The Mechanism is an instrumental strategy towards ensuring that norms on the ‘collective management of regional security’ would be strengthened and institutionalised on a permanent basis (Aning, 2004).

Also, with the regional organization under immense pressure to match up to the emerging security challenges and the many lessons learnt from the experimental interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the mechanism was aimed at providing a clear sense of direction to ECOWAS in its future security engagements. The Mechanism was therefore a replacement of earlier protocols and provides the approach through which the provisions of the Revised Treaty can be realized (Okyere, F & Atuobi, S 2010). Among others, the mechanism sought to 'prevent, manage and resolve' internal as well as interstate conflicts in order to maintain and 'consolidate peace, security and stability within West Africa' (ECOWAS, 1999:5). The protocol further sought to address issues relating to corruption, money laundering and the illicit proliferation of small arms, as significant components of its conflict resolution and prevention strategy.

Institutions responsible for the operationalization of the protocol includes: the Authority, the Mediation and Security Council (MSC) and the Executive Secretariat (ECOWAS, 1999). Other institutions established by the mechanism includes: the Defence and Security Commission, the Council of Elders and the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). It also provided for the establishment of an Early Warning Observation and Monitoring System (ECOWAS, 1999).

Under the new sub-regional security framework, the Authority, comprising the Heads of States and Governments of member states of the community is the highest decision making body. That notwithstanding, the Authority under article 7 of the Mechanism yields its power to the Mediation and Security Council (MSC) to make decisions on its behalf in ensuring the implementation of the protocol. In view of this, the MSC is vested with the authority to make decisions on all issues that pertains to sub-regional peace and security and also implements all policies geared towards 'conflict prevention, management and resolution' (Article 10). The MSC is effectively supported by the Defense and Security Commission which is responsible for determining the mandate of peacekeeping forces and 'examining all technical, administrative and logistical' concerns of peacekeeping operations (Article 11). As part of its mandate, the Commission is also required to review reports from the various 'Observation and Monitoring Centres' and based on these, make recommendations for appropriate actions to be taken by the MSC.

The Council of Elders on the other hand comprise a group of eminent persons who utilize their good offices to act as 'mediators, conciliators and facilitators' on behalf of ECOWAS during

conflicts (ECOWAS, 1999). These individuals are required by the mechanism to be neutral, objective and impartial in the discharge of their mandate. The idea of the council of elders has its origin in traditional African conflict resolution mechanisms.

Further, the Mechanism provides a clear mandate for the establishment of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG is an adhoc stand-by military wing of ECOWAS, comprising of troops from member states. Among others, ECOMOG is responsible for 'peace-keeping and restoration of peace, enforcement of sanctions, peace-building, disarmament and demobilisation, and preventive deployment' (Article 22).

To consolidate the strategies and measures put in place to prevent the occurrence of conflicts, the Mechanism established the Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC). The OMC is the focal point of the early warning system (Odobo K & Andekin, S O 2017). The centre is responsible for collecting and analyzing data essential to the prevention of conflict and violence (ECOWAS, 1999). Under the early warning system, the sub-region has been divided into four zones, based on proximity and efficiency, with each zone having a zonal headquarters. The zonal centres are responsible for the day to day monitoring of political, social and economic events that have the tendency to threaten peace and security of countries within the zone and subsequently come up with 'threat perception analysis' (Aning, 2004). Reports from the zonal bureaux are sent to the Executive Secretariat for the appropriate response mechanisms to be designed.

The Mechanism provides three means through which potential conflicts could be prevented. These include the setting up of a fact finding commission, resorting to the committee of elders or leveraging the services of the Executive Secretary (ibid). If all these strategies prove futile, then military force will be employed as the last resort by the organization. The early warning system is crucial in strengthening the national security of member states and aiding security sector reforms within the sub-region as well as promoting preventive diplomacy (Atuobi, 2010).

Unlike previous protocols that emphasized resolving inter-state conflicts, the Mechanism focuses on internal conflicts. The protocol is therefore applicable to conflicts which can potentially degenerate into a humanitarian disaster or threaten sub-regional peace and security (ECOWAS, 1999). The Mechanism may also be invoked if a conflict situation could result in gross violation of human rights or in the event of the toppling or attempt to topple a

‘democratically elected government’ (Article 25). Also, unlike previous protocols that stipulated that such interventions could only be carried out upon the request of member states, the Mechanism makes it possible for ECOWAS to intervene in a conflict upon the decision of the Authority, MSC or the Executive Secretary (Article 26).

3.5 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001)

The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (A/sp/1/12/01/) was adopted in 2001 by the Authority as a supplementary protocol to the Mechanism. Nonetheless, the protocol came into force in 2005, after it was ratified by member states. The protocol is concerned with tackling the rudimentary political causes of conflicts and instability in the region- an aspect of conflict prevention that was not comprehensively covered in the Mechanism (Odobu, K & Osagie, S 2017). In this regard, it aims at promoting democracy and the rule of law within the sub-region. The protocol upholds basic constitutional principles that member states must adhere to. These include, separation of powers among the various organs of government, the independence of the judiciary and the conduct of free and fair elections (ECOWAS, 2001). The constitutional principles contained in the protocol also include the non-tolerance ‘for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means’, the need for armed forces and other state security agencies to be apolitical and the need for citizens to be actively involved in the decision making process (ECOWAS, 2001). The protocol further calls for respect for civil and political rights and also guarantees the right of opposition parties.

Also, the protocol makes it possible for ECOWAS to assist with the conduct of elections in member states, upon request by the countries involved. In realizing this, the protocol allows for ECOWAS to dispatch an election monitoring team where necessary (ECOWAS, 2001). The protocol also affirms the need for electoral laws to be respected and remain unaltered within six months prior to elections unless otherwise with the approval of majority of political actors (ibid). This provision is significant as the sub-region experienced high levels of unconstitutional change of governments in the 1980’s and 1990’s. In some instances, these undemocratic changes of governments culminated in conflicts and civil unrest. The document therefore sought to tackle some of the fundamental causes of conflicts in West Africa.

In order to ensure the adherence of member states to the provisions of the protocol, article 45 stipulates sanctions that will be imposed on member states upon breach of the protocol. Sanctions imposed may include, the ineligibility of countries concerned to host ECOWAS

meetings, ‘suspension of member states concerned from all ECOWAS decision making bodies’ and the ‘non-recognition of the government in community fora’ (Cowell, 2011). These sanctions depict the depth of relevance ascribed to democracy and good governance as being significant components of conflict prevention in West Africa. The protocol also addresses issues pertaining to poverty reduction and discrimination against women, children and youth. As such, the protocol sets out to tackle socio-political and economic conditions which previously triggered conflicts in the sub-region (ECOWAS, 2001).

3.6 The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, 2008 (ECPF)

Despite ECOWAS’ proven commitment towards ensuring regional stability, the sub-region is yet to be completely liberated from conflicts. As such, as part of the quest to finding a permanent solution to its security challenges, ECOWAS adopted the ECPF in 2008. The ECPF was developed by the Mediation and Security Council with the intention to guide, inform and serve as a ‘strategic framework’ to enhance the capacity of ECOWAS in conflict prevention and human security (ECOWAS, 2008).

Although the Mechanism had been instrumental in containing conflicts in the community, however, the realization of the preventive aspect of the protocol had been significantly hindered by the lack of a strategic approach (Regulation MSC/REG.1/01/08). This was evident in the ‘underutilization and misdirection’ of the organizations resources, which stifled the capacity of ECOWAS for timely intervention in conflicts. The ECPF therefore seeks to address structural and operational causes of conflicts by adopting a long-term preventive approach (ECOWAS, 2008). This approach involves the prevention of the outbreak, escalation and the recurrence of conflicts. Further, the ECPF provides a strong conceptual basis for understanding and ascertaining conflict prevention in the sub-region (Ekiyor, 2008). Also, the ECPF is geared towards improving the capacity of civil society and member states of ECOWAS in conflict prevention and peacebuilding (ibid). The recognition of the role of civil society in the framework is significant as it was the first time the regional grouping explicitly acknowledged and broadened its security strategy to accommodate civil society organizations. Furthermore, the ECPF sought to enhance the capacity of ECOWAS in undertaking definite and harmonized conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives, while ensuring that conflict prevention becomes mainstream in the programs and policies of ECOWAS (Atuobi, 2010).

The ECPF has fourteen components aimed at improving human security in the sub-region. These include: ‘(1) early warning (2) preventive diplomacy (3) democracy and political governance (4) human rights and the rule of law (5) media (6) natural resource governance and (7) cross-border initiatives’. ‘The rest are (8) governance (9) practical disarmament (10) women, peace and security (11) youth empowerment (12) ECOWAS Standby Force (13) humanitarian assistance and (14) peace education’ (ECOWAS, 2008).

To ensure the successful implementation of the framework, the document outlines for each of the fourteen priority areas, activities that will be undertaken to ensure their realization, the yardstick for evaluating their progress and the capacity requirement to achieve them (Ekiyor, 2008). Also, an appropriate plan of action has been developed to ensure the implementation of all fourteen components. The ECPF therefore provides the strategy through which previous ECOWAS protocols on conflict management could be realized, by focusing fundamentally on addressing the root causes of conflicts and instability in the region (Cowell, 2011).

Compared to the Mechanism and other strategies for ensuring peace and stability in the sub-region, the ECPF marks a significant shift in a number of ways. First, it calls for improved coordination between the various departments and institutions of ECOWAS as well as among member states. Prior to the formulation of the ECPF, initiatives aimed at promoting good governance, democracy, gender equality, youth empowerment and the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Mechanism (ECOWARN) operated in isolation (Afolabi, 2016). This resulted in the inefficacious use of resources and the duplication of efforts (Atuobi, 2010). That notwithstanding, although the document emphasizes the need for harmonization and coordination of conflict prevention initiatives and efforts, yet, it does not stipulate which institutions will be responsible for its implementation.

Also, unlike the Mechanism that adopted an inward approach towards preventing conflicts, the ECPF broadens its scope to include collaboration with other sectors and a wide range of actors including state and non-state actors such as the private sector, donors, and other international organizations (Kabia, 2011). The ECPF is also significant in systematically bridging the gap that existed between ECOWAS, citizens of the community and civil society (Atuobi, 2010). Moreover, the ECPF adopts a much more comprehensive approach focusing on social, economic, security and political challenges that the sub-region is confronted with (Kabia, 2011). This strategy is relevant as it recognizes the need to resolve structural challenges in the community that makes the sub-region vulnerable to conflicts. As such, the framework makes

it incumbent for member states to address these challenges concurrently as part of their development and conflict prevention plans.

Nonetheless, since its adoption, the ECPF has been undermined by significant challenges which has rendered it ineffective. These challenges emanate from the need for the sub-regional grouping to simultaneously deal with emerging as well as ongoing security threats (Afolabi, 2016). While addressing old threats to peace and security in the region, new threats are increasingly emerging, including the resurgence of coup d'états, terrorism, electoral violence and the constraints on democratic consolidation and good governance in the sub-region (ibid:3). With ECOWAS still in the process of developing its proactive capacities to conflict prevention, the organization usually focuses on tackling unforeseen crisis rather than implementing the ECPF. Quintessentially, the sub-region was gravely hit by political crisis between 2010 and 2014 which distracted ECOWAS from operationalizing the ECPF.

Further, a study conducted by the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, revealed the low level of awareness of the ECPF among member states of the community (Okyere, F & Atuobi, S, 2010). This reflects a deeper problem hindering the implementation of ECOWAS' conflict prevention initiatives. The onus lies on member states to safeguard their territory and national security. As such, without a deliberate effort by member states to take ownership of regional strategic security frameworks, human security in the community may periodically be threatened.

3.7 Conclusion

Over the years, ECOWAS' peace and security strategies have gone through significant modifications in order to meet the changing dynamics of conflicts and new threats to security in the sub-region. Essentially, recent strategies developed by the organization have been focused on preventive measures rather than merely reacting to conflicts as they emerge. This chapter has evaluated the various protocols and frameworks adopted by ECOWAS to ensure the sustainance of peace and stability in West Africa from 1978 until 2008. Unarguably, the contribution of ECOWAS towards conflict prevention, management and resolution in West Africa has been tremendous. However, the impact of the institutional structures established by the organization has been mixed. The next chapter evaluates the challenges encountered by the bloc in its intervention in Liberia.

CHAPTER FOUR

ECOWAS INTERVENTION IN THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR (1990-1997)

4.1 Introduction

After the establishment of ECOWAS, intra-state and inter-state disputes within West Africa did not exacerbate into armed conflicts until the outburst of the Liberian civil war in 1989. The bloodbath in Liberia adversely affected its neighbouring states and challenged the capacity of ECOWAS to ensure human security in the sub-region. Prior to the civil war, the organization had not been directly involved in the internal affairs of any of its member states. In view of this, ECOWAS did not have adequate institutional structures in place to aid its intervention in Liberia. However, ECOWAS intervened regardless. This chapter focuses on the complexities and challenges pertaining to the intervention. The chapter explores three thematic areas including the background to the conflict, the ECOWAS intervention (rationale and legality of the intervention), as well as the challenges encountered by ECOWAS with regards to its diplomatic and military approaches.

4.2 Background to the Conflict

Liberia consist of fifteen indigenous ethnic groups with each group having a unique culture, tradition, belief and language (Bøås, 2010). A critical aspect of the history of Liberia pertains to the repatriation of freed slaves from the United States to the former, between 1822 and 1861 by the American Colonisation Society (ACS). The repatriated slaves settled along the coast of the West African state and numbered about 12,000 (Ero, 1995). The rationale for the repatriation of the ex-slaves was to create a haven where they could thrive and start life all over again. However, the challenge emanating from the resettlement of the freed slaves, who later established Liberia was that, they were not accustomed to the culture and traditions of the indigenous residents they encountered (Rosenberg, 1985). Hence, their survival was dependent on the strength they exuded in their relations with the local folks. Upon establishing Liberia, the Americo-Liberians, with little education and governance experience, formed a government which was premised on the concept of ‘the self’ and ‘the other’, based on their experience as slaves in America (Pitts, 1999). Highly discontented with their oppressive rule, the indigenous people rebelled on several occasions. As such, the Liberian state was built on a foundation deeply rooted in hatred and resentment.

After the establishment of the True Whig Party (TWP) in 1870, Liberia became a one-party state with the Americo-Liberians controlling every aspect of political, economic and social life in the country (Bøås, 2010). The oligarchic rule of the TWP side-lined the indigenous people,

as they were perceived as second-class citizens. The TWP also adopted the indirect rule system of governance to control the territories in the hinterlands. This system entrenched existing ethnic animosities and rivalries among the indigenous people and further deprived them the opportunity to vote during elections (Rosenberg, 1985).

However, when William Tubman became president in 1944, he pursued a policy of unification that sought to include the indigenous people in the governance process (Tarr, 1993). Tubman's administration focused on modernizing the country's economy and developing the basic infrastructure. In spite of this, Tubman repressed political opposition and rewarded his loyal cronies with 'public money' (Ero, 1995). This approach defeated his integrationist agenda as the stratification between citizens persisted. In view of this, upon his succession by William Tolbert in 1971, majority of Liberians lived in extreme poverty and the neo-patrimonial and clientelist political structures were dominated by the Americo-Liberian minority.

Tolbert continued with the 'integrationist policies' initiated by his predecessor and broadened political participation (Sessay, 1996). The new administration was however plagued with corruption and mismanagement of state resources. Unlike the previous administration which thrived on oppression of political opposition to ensure sustenance of the status quo, Tolbert's inability to use patronage and coercion rendered his regime insecure (Tarr, 1993). During his tenure, two leading civil society organizations emerged. The Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA) and the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL) were formed with the intention to influence the government to deal with the social injustice prevalent in the country (Sessay, 1996). The frustration and discontent of the citizens culminated when the government passed a law depriving landless and poor Liberians from voting as well as the government's plan to increase the price of rice (Pitts, 1999). A demonstration organized by PAL to protest against the hike in rice prices in April 1979 resulted in a conflict between protestors and the police. Consequently, Tolbert declared a state of emergency and ordered for the arrest of leaders of opposition groups.

In view of this, on 12 April 1980, a group of seventeen young soldiers led by Samuel Doe toppled the government and assassinated Tolbert and some other member of his administration (Sirleaf, 1991). Most Liberians supported the coup d'état as they envisioned a new era of economic growth and development. Initially, the military junta undertook some reforms to improve the livelihood of civil servants and military personnel. However, Doe did not resolve the neo-patrimonial structure established by the previous regimes (Kufour, 1993). The

leadership of the People's Redemption Council (PRC), established after the coup, enriched themselves with state resources and further polarized and politicized ethnicity. Although Doe's despotic regime engaged in widespread human rights abuses, yet, it gained the support of the US due to the Cold War (ibid). After five years of military rule, Doe agreed to undertake constitutional reforms and conduct elections in 1985. The election was rigged in Doe's favour and shortly afterwards, an attempted coup to topple his regime by Thomas Qwiwonkpa, an ethnic Gio was foiled. In response, the Armed forces of Liberia systematically repressed all opponents of the ruling party, especially the Gio and Mano communities (Kieh, 2004). It is against this background that the fourteen years civil war occurred.

In view of the prevailing socio-economic conditions, on Christmas eve 1989, Charles Taylor together with a small group of armed men invaded Liberia from neighbouring Cote D'Ivoire (Sirleaf, 1991). The number of young men joining Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) increased tremendously with time. This was an evidence that the uprising was supported by many Liberians who were frustrated by Doe's despotic regime. In response to the rebellion, Doe's army targeted the ethnic Gio's and Mano's, the support base of Taylor. The NPFL on the contrary targeted Krahn and Mandingo communities in their reprisal attacks (Sesay, 1996). The fighting along ethnic lines at the initial stages of the conflict set a precedent for subsequent militia groups to be formed along the same lines.

4.3 ECOWAS Intervention

Due to the heavy-handed counterinsurgency strategy adopted by the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the war quickly spread across the country, reaching Monrovia by mid-1990. The fighting resulted in gross violation of human rights and indiscriminate attacks on embassies. The United Nations office in Monrovia for instance, was attacked by the AFL on 30 May 1990 (Tuck, 2000). As such, the impending humanitarian crisis resulted in a call for the international community to intervene.

Without well-established institutions to respond to the atrocities in Monrovia, ECOWAS established a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to redress the crisis in April 1990 (Kieh, 2004). The committee was however intended to assume a permanent role in conflict mediation within the sub-region (Walraven, 1999). As a first step towards resolving the conflict, the SMC established ECOMOG, comprising contingents from the five-member states that formed the committee (Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Gambia and Togo) in addition to Sierra-Leone and Guinea-Conakry (ibid). However, other member states of the community contributed towards the

troops later in the intervention. The SMC also set-up a Special Emergency Fund to mobilize funds to support ECOMOG's operations in Liberia.

4.3.1 Rationale behind the intervention

As the invasion evolved into full scale war, the international community refrained from intervening. The US in particular was more interested in the Iraq invasion of Kuwait rather than the crisis in Liberia. Similarly, the UN Security Council refrained from intervening in the conflict (Tarr, 1993). As such, the sub-regional group took upon itself the mandate to determine the fate of Liberia. In view of this, ECOWAS stipulated a number of reasons why the intervention was necessary.

The first reason alluded by ECOWAS for the intervention pertained to regional stability (Sirleaf, 1991). Members of the community argued that, the refugee crisis emanating from the conflict could potentially destabilize Liberia's neighbouring states. According to General Erskine of ECOMOG, "the crisis in Liberia was creating an unbearable refugee problem for Sierra Leone, Ghana, the Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast. Hence, it was obvious that the situation in Liberia had gone beyond the boundaries of the country and ceased to be an exclusive Liberian question" (Olu,1997:3). Beyond the refugee crisis, the ongoing war had spilled over into neighbouring Sierra Leone. The NPFL assisted the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone to overthrow the 29-year old constitutionally elected government in Freetown (Sesay, 1996). This sparked fear among the leaders of the community that the NPFL could support and incite war across West Africa, which would eventually threaten existing regimes and destabilize the region. This became a primary issue of concern because Taylor's NPLF comprised of youths from across West Africa, hence making it possible for any such rebellion to be sustained in other countries within the sub-region (Adibe, 1997).

Further, ECOWAS justified its decision to intervene on humanitarian grounds (Adeleke, 1995). The SMC argued that the country had been rendered ungovernable and that warring factions had 'held the entire population hostage, depriving them of food, health facilities and other basic necessities of life' (Olu,1997). Also, the use of child soldiers by the warring factions became an issue of concern to the community. The intervention was therefore aimed at stopping the massacre and human rights abuses, in order to restore the country to normalcy and reinstate democracy.

Another justification for the intervention was based on the PMAD which provided for member states to request for assistance from the regional body upon the outbreak of conflicts instigated

or supported from outside (Okyere, 2014). In view of this, Doe wrote a letter to the chairman of ECOWAS and the SMC requesting for the organization to dispatch a peace-keeping force to calm the turmoil. Some scholars however argue that Doe could not be regarded as the legal authority in the country considering the fact that a greater part of the country at the time of the request was under the control of the NPLF (Afolabi, 2017). This study, however, argues that such a supposition will be untenable as a successful insurrection does not invalidate the legitimacy of a constitutionally elected government.

Nonetheless, these were not the only justification for the intervention as individual member states of the community had unique reasons why they supported the intervention. Nigeria's leadership role in the ECOMOG operation is worth understudying. Historically, the relationship that existed between Nigeria and Liberia was based on the principles underlying the formers foreign policy of promoting African integration (Arowolo, 2015). In this regard, both countries were instrumental in the formation of ECOWAS. However, the coup d'état that resulted in the overhauling of the Tubman administration resulted in a strain relationship between the constitutionally elected government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari of Nigeria and his Liberian counterpart Samuel Doe (Kufour, 1993). Shagari condemned Doe's ascendancy into the presidency on the grounds that such actions carried the potency of spreading into other parts of the already politically instable region. In view of this, Nigeria adopted a diplomatic offensive approach towards Doe's government. A case in point was the resistance of Nigeria towards Doe's admission into the ECOWAS summit hosted by Abuja in 1980. However, Nigeria's foreign policy towards Liberia changed in the mid-1980's. This came as a result of Abuja's mediatory role in the diplomatic crisis which arose between Liberia and the other member states of the Mano River Union, after the latter was accused of supporting anti-Doe rebellion (Ofodile, 1994).

As such, the initial reaction of Nigeria to the civil war was to view it as an internal affair which required no external involvement (Arowolo, 2015). In view of this, Nigeria refrained from evacuating its nationals from Monrovia, since that would have created the impression that the situation in the country was out of control. However, Doe's visit to Nigeria to request for armaments to quell the rebellion resulted in some belligerents perceiving Abuja as an ardent supporter of Doe's regime. The subsequent attacks on Nigerians and other foreign nationals influenced Nigeria's stance on the conflict (Okyere, 2014).

Nigeria's leading role in the operation of ECOMOG was therefore based on Abuja's foreign policy and responsibility to protect Nigerians abroad (Gberie, 2004). At the onset of the crisis, several thousand foreign nationals were trapped in Monrovia including 6000 Ghanaians and over 5000 Nigerians. In July 1990, the NPLF attacked and killed about a thousand Nigerians who had taken refuge in the Nigerian Embassy in Monrovia (Afolabi, 2017). In view of such blatant disregard for international diplomatic principles, Abuja needed to revise its strategy in order to safeguard the security of its nationals in Monrovia (Howe, 1996). Added to this, Nigeria also had economic interest in Liberia as Abuja had invested in various sectors of the Monrovia economy including the oil and iron ore industries. The head of state of Nigeria, Ibrahim Babangida, also had personal ties with Samuel Doe "with whom he had established business ties by participating in the Liberian national oil company" (Walraven, 1999). Nigeria had also given Liberia a grant of 20 million dollars to support the building of an institution of higher learning (ibid). It was therefore in the national interest of Nigeria to champion the regional blocs intervention.

Abuja was also concerned with the ripple effect of the insurgency in Liberia, fearing that it would flare a new wave of insurgency across the sub-region (Adeleke, 1995). At the early stages of the intervention, Babangida stressed the potential threat the defeat of the Liberian military posed to the sub-region. He further postulated that the success of the insurrection would undermine the strength and political standing of the military in the region (Tavares, 2011). This fear was aggravated by the fact that the NPFL was not only composed of Liberians but also, nationals of other West African states (Ero, 1995). This reaffirmed the suspicion that the rebellion was not only targeted at Liberia but the sub-region. These youngsters had received training, money and ammunitions from Libya to aid the insurgency in West Africa (ibid). With socio-economic and political conditions in Liberia similar to that of other countries in the sub-region and the readiness of the NPFL to support other insurrections, the uprising appeared to have been the beginning of instability in the region. Nigeria therefore aimed at not only salvaging itself but the sub-region from the emerging anarchy and chaos. Besides, Nigeria wanted to reassert and protect itself as a hegemonic power in the region (Gberie, 2004). "Nigeria's military brass hats were determined, at all costs, to make a success of their historical role as the protective 'big brother' with special responsibilities in the subregion" (ibid).

With its attributes of natural resources, size and military capability, Nigeria's hegemonic role in leading peace initiatives in her geo-political zone is not unprecedented (Arowolo, 2015). As such, Nigeria assumed the leadership role in the intervention in order to dissuade Western

powers, especially France, from permeating the region. Such a postulation is consistent with Hettne's (2008) conception of security regionalism. Abuja also sought to limit the influence of the Francophone states in the sub-region. Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire for instance were ardent opposers of Nigeria's leadership role in the region. Hence, their support for the NPFL sparked up a substantive challenge for regional hegemony (Salami, 2015). Further, the involvement of Libya in the conflict posed a threat to Nigeria's hegemonic role since the former's support for the NPFL was geared towards gaining a significant amount of influence in West Africa (ibid). In this way, the reputation of Nigeria as a powerful force that ensured the stability of the region was threatened by these countries involved in the conflict, hence necessitating Abuja's reaction.

Ghana on the other hand intervened for reasons distinct from Nigeria, but with the same goal of advancing its national interest. On the individual level of analysis, Ghana's head of state at the time, Jerry John Rawlings was a military dictator. As such, attempts by Taylor to topple Doe, who was an ex-military dictator seemed unacceptable to him (Pitts, 1999). Also, Accra had strained relations with Libya and Burkina Faso at the time of the insurrection. With these countries supporting the NPFL, Ghana found it prudent to support ECOMOG, especially after Taylor recruited some Ghanaians into his 'army' (Tavares, 2011). Also, the burden of hosting refugees from the war and the many Ghanaians trapped in Liberia influenced Ghana's decision to intervene. Sierra Leone and Gambia also supported the ECOWAS intervention because of the threat the conflict posed to their national security. Beyond this, Freetown supported the intervention to please its ally, Nigeria. This is due to the latter's financial support to boost economic development in Sierra Leone (ibid).

On the other hand, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire, though members states of ECOWAS supported the NPFL for personal, economic and strategic reasons (Sessay, 1996). As a matter of fact, personal reasons were extremely crucial in explaining the posture of these countries. A significant factor which influenced Abidjan's position in the conflict pertained to the assassination of Adolphus Tolbert, the son-in-law of Houphouet-Boigny, during the Doe-led coup d'état (Tuck, 2000). In view of this, the cordial relation between both countries was ruined. However, Houphouet-Boigny's daughter later got married to Blaise Compaore, who became Head of State of Burkina Faso in 1987. Hence paving the way for an anti-Doe alliance to be formed by these countries (Walraven, 1999). It is in view of this, that Burkina Faso became the base for training NPFL combatants and further supplied arms to Taylor. Also, with the availability of iron ore and tropical timber in Liberia, the support from these countries

implied that they could get easy access to exploit Monrovia's natural resources. As such, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire opposed the ECOWAS intervention from the onset of the crisis.

4.3.1 Legality of the Intervention

Prior to the Liberian civil war, ECOWAS had adopted the Protocol on Non-Aggression and the PMAD. The former protocol could not have provided a justification for the intervention since it was only concerned with inter-state conflicts (Kufour, 1993). The PMAD however provided a basis on which ECOWAS could intervene. The protocol allowed for the organization to intervene in conflicts, provided such dissensions were externally induced. Nonetheless, a recourse to this protocol as the legal basis for the intervention would be questionable, since the institutions stipulated by the protocol to redress conflicts had not been established at the time ECOWAS intervened (Walraven, 1999). As stated in chapter three, the PMAD made it permissible for decisions regarding military interventions to be taken and implemented by the Defence Council with the assistance of the Defence Commission. As such, a decision to intervene taken by any institution other than the aforementioned contravenes the blocs existing legal and procedural standards. Hence, making it untenable for the protocol to be alluded as a justification for the intervention. Again, article 16 of the PMAD stipulated that, a request for sub-regional intervention in a conflict should be channelled through the chairperson of ECOWAS. However, Doe submitted his request through the Chairman of the SMC, hence further making it indefensible for the PMAD to be used as a reference point for the intervention (Howe, 1996). Again, the SMC's claim to be acting on behalf of the authority seem to have been *ultra vires*, considering the fact that the Authority only explicitly sanctioned the SMC's decision in November 1990 after ECOMOG had already intervened (Ero, 1995).

In any case, the PMAD permits regional intervention in domestic conflicts only if the uprising is supported and sustained by an external force. In view of this, the community could have intervened legitimately if it had proven that there was an external entity supporting the NPFL or any of the other factions. However, there were no attempts by the Authority to probe and authenticate the claim that the war was being supported and sustained from outside, hence making it difficult for the above article to be used as a justification for the intervention (Kufour, 1993).

The UN Charter allows for regional organizations to be involved in conflict management provided such crisis threatens international security (Ofodile, 1994). That notwithstanding, regional organizations are required by the Charter to subject any such interventions to the approval of the UN Security Council (UNSC). This renders any intervention with the barking

of the UNSC morally and legally acceptable. In view of this, the ECOWAS intervention cannot be regarded as legal since it was not explicitly sanctioned by the UNSC. Ofodile (1994) argues that, the ECOWAS operation in Liberia could have been consistent with international law provided the purpose of the operation was limited to peacekeeping. This, he argues is because, peacekeeping operations do not necessarily require the permission of the UNSC, since all parties involved in the conflict must consent to the operation. However, the dispatch of ECOMOG was without the consent of all parties involved in the conflict, hence undermining the acceptability of the intervention. This was further aggravated by the fact that ECOMOG deviated from peacekeeping into peace enforcement.

Also, the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States by the UN General Assembly emphasizes the need for the international community to refrain from intruding in the internal affairs of states (UN, 1970). The document further conceives force as an unacceptable means of settling international issues and a contravention of international law. Similarly, the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in Internal Affairs of States also prohibits any state or group of states from ‘interfering in any form or for any reason’ in the internal affairs of other states (UN, 1981). From these Declarations and the UN Charter, the ECOWAS intervention was problematic, especially because ECOMOG became a belligerent in the war at some point in the conflict. Again, there is no justification within international law to support the claim that a conflict which results in a refugee crisis threatens international peace and security, hence meriting external intervention. All these reasons render the intervention illegal, at least according to international customary law.

4.4 The ECOWAS Conflict Management Strategy in Liberia

The SMC adopted a dual approach that intended to end the conflict and reinstate a constitutionally elected government. The ECOWAS Peace Plan (EPP) served as the framework that guided the organization in its quest to achieve the aforementioned objectives. The committee took an unprecedented decision to establish and dispatch a peacekeeping mission into Liberia, named ECOMOG (Ero, 1995).

Among others, the EPP was geared towards appealing to the warring factions to observe a ceasefire in order to pave way for the restoration of peace and security in the country (Howe, 1996). The SMC further intended on establishing a broad-based interim government as well as conduct free and fair elections within 12 months (Arowolo, 2015). The approach adopted by ECOWAS was therefore aimed at dissuading the parties to the conflict from leveraging

violence as a means to achieving their goals and rather offer a peaceful conduit through which their grievances could be resolved. The organization's recourse to military intervention was however aimed at deterring the warring factions from keeping up with their viciousness.

4.4.1 The Military Approach

On 24 August 1990, ECOMOG, comprising 3000 troops was dispatched into Monrovia. The size of the troops however increased significantly to 9000 in 1991 and 16000 in 1993 (Pitts, 1999). The mandate of ECOMOG was to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire as stipulated in the EPP and also to restore law and order into Liberia, as well as keeping the peace in the country (Bøås, 2010). From this, the mandate of ECOMOG signifies that of a peacekeeping force. An assertion that is further evident in the name of the sub-regional force- '...cease-fire monitoring group' (Walraven, 1999). That notwithstanding, the restoration of law and order included in the mandate of ECOMOG implicitly ascribed a peace-enforcement role to the mission (ibid). Although the operation of ECOMOG was envisioned to be short, the presence of the multinational force in Liberia lasted longer than expected. Between 1990 and 1998, ECOMOG was involved in a variety of activities including, the 'protection of humanitarian aid, disarming of factions and peace-enforcement operations among others' (Tuck, 2000).

The first challenge arising from the intervention pertains to the absence of consensus regarding the deployment of ECOMOG at the regional level and among the warring factions (Tarr, 1993). At the regional level, some member states of the community vehemently opposed the intervention. In the absence of a legal instrument legitimating the intervention, Burkina Faso argued for member states to reach a consensus prior to the deployment of the troops (Walraven, 1999). Senegal and Togo on the other hand expressed concern over the non-involvement of all member states in the decision leading to the deployment of the so-called regional force. Mali on the other hand indicated that the SMC had violated its mandate. In view of this, Togo and Mali refrained from contributing troops towards the operation (Pitts, 1999). Similarly, Taylor's NPFL perceived ECOMOG as an invasion force, hence intensifying its hostilities towards the multinational force. Taylor's position was premised on the grounds that, at the time of the intervention, the NPFL controlled over 90 percent of the Liberian territory. With Taylor envisioning a quick victory, he saw the intervention as undermining the sovereignty of the Liberian people (Sesay, 1996). As such, the decision to intervene was shrouded with controversies that could have been avoided had the regional group taken an unbiased and objective approach towards the conflict. The dissension surrounding the deployment of

ECOMOG adversely affected the commitment of member states towards resolving the conflict and rendered cooperation from the NPFL difficult to attain.

In terms of peacekeeping, ECOMOG encountered significant challenges in its operations. This was to be expected as the countries that contributed troops to the operation lacked expertise in peacekeeping (Adeleke, 1995). A significant component of peacekeeping operations is the trust and willingness of belligerents to cooperate with the intervening force. This can only be attained if the force is perceived as neutral, impartial and legitimate (Kennedy, 2018). These conditions were however absent at the time of the intervention. Also, with Taylor's intention not only to fight but to frustrate the peacekeeping force, the conditions for a successful peacekeeping operation was absent. In fact, there was no peace to keep at the time ECOMOG was deployed into Monrovia (Tuck, 2000). Added to the above, peacekeeping operations do not only thrive on the capacity of the force to reach a cease fire agreement. But transcends that to include lessening the capacity of belligerents to resume combats after a cease-fire pact is signed. However, due to the competing interest involved in the conflict, especially between Ghana and Nigeria on the one hand and Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire on the other, arriving at a 'post cease-fire objective' became daunting (Arowolo, 2015).

Further, another challenge encountered by ECOMOG related to its peace enforcement approach. In order to undertake a successful peace enforcement operation, it is incumbent that the multinational force has a leader that is willing to take responsibility, direct and guide the mission. It also requires that the peace enforcement force has a higher military capability in comparison with the target (Zartman, 1989: Eke, 2010). However, in the case of ECOWAS, these conditions were not fulfilled. Particularly, Nigeria proved itself as a domineering leader in the operation with most decisions taken unilaterally by Abuja. This was not surprising as Nigeria contributed the highest in terms of funding for the operation as well as troops. For instance, as at February 1995, the ECOMOG troops numbered a little over 8000 with Nigeria providing almost 5000 of the troops (Tuck, 2000). Abuja also contributed about 70 percent of the funds for the operation (ibid). As such, Nigeria seemingly dominated every facet of the operation including championing attempts at soliciting for funds from Western donors as well as representing the organization in the United Nations (Afolabi, 2017). Not only did Nigeria contribute the highest number of troops, Nigerians also dominated the senior positions in ECOMOG (Jimoh, 2014). Nigeria's overly domineering role resulted in the lack of a united front for the operation as most of the participating countries were highly discontented with the former's actions. In particular, Abuja's unilateral decision to replace the Ghanaian Force

Commander- Lt. General Arnold Quainoo, with a Nigerian, Major General Joshua Dogonyaro-sparked up controversy and resentment among the contributing states (Tarr, 1993). As such, a unanimous approach for the peaceful resolution of the conflict was almost impossible to attain. On the contrary, Nigeria could have adopted a diplomatic approach in its leadership, centred on pursuing the interest and common good of all member states of ECOWAS. This approach would have rendered the intervention less tense and supported by the community.

Furthermore, for any peacekeeping operation to be successful, it is relevant that the intervening force possess an in-depth understanding of the socio-cultural dynamics, politics, economy as well as the demography of the country its intervening in (Howe, 1996). This cannot be underestimated as most conflicts are complex. In view of this, an effectual conflict resolution requires a better understanding of the context within which the war is occurring. Understanding the context is also important because it serves as the basis for determining the strategies and approach to be adopted in resolving the conflict. However, in the case of the ECOWAS intervention, the force lacked sufficient knowledge about Liberia (Mareike, 2015). It is due to this that ECOMOG underestimated the conflict in all its ramifications as well as the capacity of the NPFL. Contrary to the perception of the leaders of ECOWAS that the intervention would be ‘a short surgical police action’, the conflict lasted over a longer period of time and proved to be extremely difficult to resolve (Ofodile, 1994). From this, it is quite evident that ECOMOG did not prepare adequately prior to arriving in Monrovia and as such became weary with time.

Closely linked to this is the logistical challenges the operation frequently run into. Walraven (1999) argues that ECOMOG lacked the needed equipment, communication and intelligence to enhance the success of the operation. Interestingly, the operation lacked a detailed map of Liberia to aid its navigation of the country and radios to enhance communication in the event of attacks. Similarly, some of the troops arrived in Liberia without their personal arsenals (Tuck, 2000). In other instances where the various contingents brought their own weaponry, there was a challenge with compatibility in terms of usage of the distinct weapons, some of which were obtained from the West and others the Eastern bloc during the cold war (Ero, 1995).

Also, as a result of poor culture of maintenance, most of the available military equipment were not in the right shape to be used for the intervention. Considering Liberia’s topography which is predominantly forest and mountains, a lack of weaponry on the part of ECOMOG gave room for the rebels to have a leeway with their guerrilla tactics (Bøås, 2010). The lack of air capability by the regional force greatly affected the operations counter-insurgency strategy.

Also, due to the lack of consensus on the operation, ECOMOG lacked the needed manpower to enable the force to realize its mandate of peacekeeping and later peace-enforcement. Most of the member states of the community either lacked personnel or were constrained by the cost of financing their troops (Pitts, 1999). Due to this, checkpoints were usually too far apart to ensure effective monitoring of the cease-fire. It is in view of this that ECOMOG could only protect Monrovia but not enforce peace in the rest of the country, especially the hinterlands (Sessay, 1996). The challenge encountered by ECOMOG in this sphere is not new to international peacekeeping operations. This is especially true for regional and sub-regional organizations in developing countries. However, this challenge could have been avoided had the international community shown keen interest and provided financial support for the operation.

Added to the above, another challenge to the operation was the compromised neutrality of ECOMOG (Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 2007). Successful peacekeeping operations require the neutrality of the intervention force in order to attain the trust of the belligerents. However, ECOMOG took sides in the conflict, hence rendering the peacekeepers belligerents in the war (Okwere, 2014). This could be attributed in some regard to Nigeria's quest to completely defeat the NPFL. Although many factions emerged in the course of the conflict, the main target of ECOMOG was the NPFL. It is in view of this that Taylor refused to disarm his men and conform to the terms of agreements signed during the mediation process (Tuck, 2000).

Moreover, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), both parties to the conflict, fought alongside ECOMOG (Howe, 1996). Since these factions did not have the military capability to challenge ECOMOG, they opted to collaborate with the regional force against the NPFL- their common enemy (Tarr, 1993). The INPFL assisted ECOMOG with combat and intelligence in order to enable the regional force to permeate the swamps of Monrovia (ibid). In exchange, the former was given some privileges including armed access into ECOMOG's headquarters (Kennedy, 2018). It is as a result of these collaborations that Samuel Doe was arrested and murdered by the INPFL in the ECOMOG headquarters. In addition, these rebel groups received ammunitions from the regional force.

The Nigerian-led force adopted this approach as a way of cutting down on its financial cost and casualties as well as to increase pressure on the NPFL (Pitts, 1999). The focus of ECOMOG on the NPFL resulted in the mission overlooking other potential solutions to the conflict as

well as the role of the other factions in fuelling the conflict. By supporting some factions to the conflict, ECOMOG made it extremely difficult to realize peace (Howe, 1996). Most importantly, by supporting these warlords, ECOMOG covertly expressed support for the human right abuses perpetrated by these factions, hence tainting the reputation of ECOWAS. Eventually, the approach adopted by the regional force could not prevent Taylor from ceding power. It also made it extremely difficult for ECOMOG to be trusted with monitoring the cease-fire, demobilizing and disarming the parties to the conflict (Tarr, 1993). In view of this, ECOMOG's presence in Monrovia prolonged rather than shortened the conflict.

The troops were also involved in some malpractices including corruption and profiteering (Howe, 1996). Although Liberians expressed gratitude for the intervention that saved their lives, they were displeased with the conduct of some ECOMOG personnel. Whereas the contingent from Ghana and elsewhere earned an honourable reputation, some other troops including those from Nigeria tarnished the stature of ECOWAS (Brown, 1999). It is based on this that the operation was dubbed by some Liberians as 'Every Car or Moving Object Gone' (Tuck, 2000). These malpractices could however be attributed to the fact that junior officers in the Nigerian contingent usually went unpaid for months. In order to make up for this, some personnel resorted to taking bribe, extorting civilians, and pilfering humanitarian supplies (Kennedy, 2018). A case in point was the looting of the LIMINCO iron refinery to the tune of 50 million dollars, at a time when the area was a restricted zone under the surveillance of ECOMOG (ibid). Also, some ECOMOG troops aided belligerents to transport stolen goods and further made ammunitions available to them (Tuck, 2000). Nicholas Burns, former US State Department spokesman summarizes the misconduct of the troops this way, "ECOMOG troops have been heavily involved since the day they arrived in ripping off Liberians, in looting goods and in dealing in contraband" (Salami, 2014).

4.4.2 The Diplomatic Approach (Peace-making)

The resolution of the Liberian crisis did not only entail military tactics but also a vigorous peace-making process. The diplomatic process comprised of ECOWAS convening several peace talks as well as national conferences within and outside Liberia (Sessay, 1996). For the purposes of this thesis, there will be no detailed exploration of the mediation processes adopted. The study will, however, be concerned with the challenges encountered in the process.

Prior to the involvement of ECOWAS in the mediation of the crisis, there had been attempts by the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC) and the Inter-religious Council of Liberia to bring the warring factions to the negotiating table (Mustapha, A & Okyere F, 2014). Mediation

efforts by the IFMC, though unsuccessful, provided a viable ground for ECOWAS to take over. The initial efforts at brokering peace in Liberia were unsuccessful due to the ‘unreasonable preconditions’ put forth by the NPFL for negotiating the crisis (ibid). Taylor’s stance was unduly influenced by the lack of neutrality on the part of ECOWAS. In all, fourteen peace agreements were brokered by ECOWAS between 1990 and 1997 (Kieh, 2004). The enormous number of peace agreements reflects the complexity of the conflict and the daunting task imposed on ECOWAS as the mediator. Notwithstanding, the ECOWAS mediation efforts took place at different stages of the conflict and involved a wide range of actors including the OAU and UN.

After adopting the EPP, the SMC failed on three occasions -Bamako (1990) , Lome (1991) and Monrovia, (1991)- to get Taylor to concur to the Peace Plan (Kennedy, 2018). Amidst these failures, the negotiation process was handed over to the Committee of Five, headed by the Ivorian President (Brown, 1999). There was however a significant challenge with the Ivorian President leading the negotiations as he opposed the intervention at the early stages of the conflict. With his incessant support to the NPFL, his neutrality in the negotiation process was questionable. This is, however, a flaw of the sub-regional group as it failed to realize the impact such biased mediators could have on the peace process. It was therefore not surprising that the Yamoussoukro and Geneva meetings organized by the committee could not end the conflict (ibid).

One of the challenges encountered during the peace process was the lack of logistics, funding and technical capacity (Okyere, 2014). External entities that offered to finance the process did so in pursuit of their parochial interest and further adopted the ‘carrot and stick’ approach (Bøås, 2010). Again, considering the fact that the Liberian civil war marked a new era of conflicts, most member states of the community were lax in supporting the peace talks with their scarce resources. Also, due to the lack of a formal structure and a well-established procedure to facilitate the mediation and negotiation process, most of the efforts of the SMC were based on ad hoc arrangements (Okyere, 2014). These arrangements were usually slowed as the SMC juggled supervising the ECOMOG operations with the diplomatic processes together.

Another challenge encountered during the mediation process was a lack of clarity on the definition and end goal the negotiation was expected to achieve (Ero, 1995). This could be attributed to the divergent perspectives from which the various parties and actors perceived the

conflict, 'depending on their interest and negotiating positions' (Tuck, 2000). This unduly prolonged the conflict and resulted in the emergence of other splinter and rebel groups. This phenomenon could also be attributed to the lack of a monitoring mechanism put in place to ensure that peace-agreements were adhered to. This constantly undermined peace pacts as there were always new parties to the conflict with varying interest and positions (Kieh, 2004).

The situation was further complicated with some factions doubting the neutrality of ECOWAS. This rendered confidence building between the various belligerents almost impossible to reach in the mediation process. Okyere (2014) argues that, at the onset of the conflict, ECOWAS was much more interested in reaching a paper-based consensus just to prove to the world that it had been able to arrive at a peace agreement rather than fostering trust and confidence among the signatories to the pact. Subsequently, after the peace agreements had been signed, the factions resumed fighting. It is therefore not surprising that until the involvement of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in the mediation process, ECOWAS could not achieve a lasting peace.

Further, a successful mediation requires that all parties to a conflict recognize the adverse impact a unilateral solution could have on the negotiation process (Kennedy, 2018). Such solutions either result in a stalemate during the process or the abortion of the process in its entirety by the disaffected party (ibid). Since Taylor controlled a greater part of Liberia prior to the intervention, he did not deem it prudent to make concessions to any other solutions proposed during the negotiations (Walraven, 1999). Similarly, with ECOWAS playing a crucial role in the formation of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), the IGNU capitalized on its legitimacy in order not to make compromises (Afolabi, 2017). Since the IGNU received the unwavering support of ECOWAS, it made it practically difficult for the belligerents to recognize the depth of the mayhem the Liberian people were going through and the need for a peace agreement to be reached and respected by all parties.

Nevertheless, although Taylor initially presented a unilateral position, he later presented alternative proposals (Ofodile, 1994). Taylor's new stance reflected the warlord's willingness to disarm his militia under the auspices of the UN, on condition that all other factions would do same (ibid). This was understandable, considering the assassination of Doe under the watch of ECOMOG. However, this proposal which could have potentially shortened the span of the war was rejected by ECOWAS. From this, it appeared that ECOWAS had taken an entrenched position, hence making it difficult for other alternatives to be considered. This reemphasized

Taylor's initial assertion that ECOWAS only sought to deny him the opportunity to accede to power. Prior to this, the NPFL and all the other rebel groups had been excluded from the interim government through the provisions of the EPP. This conflicted with the interest of Taylor as he waged war only as a means to capture state power. It is in view of this that Taylor formed his own government in Gbarnga shortly after the 1991 Bamako peace agreement (Pitts, 1999). The diplomatic process was therefore stifled by ECOWAS' inability to create a conducive environment for the negotiations to take place in good faith. The sub-regional organization thus became a part of the problem rather than the solution.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has been concerned with the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. Among others, the chapter explored the factors precipitating the war and identified the oligarchic rule of the Americo-Liberians as the root cause and Doe's bad governance as the proximate motivation for the insurrection. The chapter further examined some challenges encountered by ECOWAS in its diplomatic and military strategies. The first of such challenges pertained to the lack of a legal justification for the intervention. The chapter also explored other challenges encountered by ECOMOG including the lack of neutrality of the force, the excessive dominance of Nigeria in the operation and the logistical and financial challenges encountered by the force. The last section examined some challenges encountered in the mediation process. The next chapter explores the ECOWAS intervention in Cote d'Ivoire.

CHAPTER FIVE

ECOWAS AND THE POST-ELECTION CRISIS IN COTE D'IVOIRE, 2010-2011

5.1 Introduction

The conflict in Liberia marked a new phase of turbulence in West Africa. Although ECOWAS hoped the successful resolution of the crisis could usher the region into a new era of peace and stability, it was rather the beginning of a long and painstaking attempt to prevent the deterioration of the sub-region's fragile security. After mediating between the various factions in the first Ivorian civil war, ECOWAS and its international partners were optimistic that the 2010 elections would seal efforts at stabilizing the world's leading cocoa producer. Unfortunately, the outcome of the election turned into a nightmare that did not only haunt Ivory Coast but the rest of West Africa and the international community. The role of ECOWAS in the post-election crisis in Ivory Coast is unique in many respects. Unlike previous interventions where the regional bloc dispatched a peacekeeping mission, there was no military intervention in Yamoussoukro. Also, whereas other conflicts in the sub-region had been ignored by the international community, the crisis in Ivory Coast attracted the attention of various international actors. Further, for the first time, the capacity of ECOWAS to challenge the legitimacy of a de facto president was brought to light. This chapter exposes the challenges encountered by ECOWAS in its intervention in Cote d'Ivoire. The chapter consists of four sections. The first section discusses the background to the conflict. Section two evaluates the role of France, AU and the UN in resolving the conflict. Section three probes the challenges encountered by ECOWAS from the diplomatic standpoint and the last section analyses why military intervention was desirable but could not be implemented by ECOWAS.

5.2 Background to the conflict

The root cause of the post-election violence in Cote d'Ivoire is intricate and multi-dimensional. After gaining independence from the French, the government of Felix Houphouet-Boigny championed the efficacious utilization of state lands by all residents of the country, regardless of their citizenship status (Zounmenou, 2011). Despite this initiative, Houphouet-Boigny's regime was excessively dominated by the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI). Although the regime suppressed political opposition and did not uphold the tenets of good governance, the country's hospitality towards migrants paved the way for an influx of foreigners into Ivory

Coast. These migrants augmented the country's labour deficit, hence contributing towards Cote d'Ivoire's economic development (ibid). Houphouet-Boigny, however, became the central figure around whom socio-economic and political activities in the country revolved (Novosseloff, 2018). It is in view of this that although the country lacked well-functioning institutional structures, yet the regime managed to resolve all conflicts of interest that could have resulted in the deterioration of the state. That notwithstanding, the later part of Houphouet-Boigny's government was stifled by economic crises and a call for democratization and social reform (Abatan, 2016). Upon his death in December 1993, Konan Bedie- speaker of the National Assembly- assumed the role of president.

Bedie deviated significantly from his predecessor in terms of the inclusivity of people of non-Ivorian descent in the governance process. He introduced a myopic conception of citizenship based on a populist policy known as Ivoirité (Akpokpari, 2008). This policy was geared towards excluding his political rival, Allasane Dramane Ouattara, from participating in the 1995 elections (Doyle, 2010). The policy was targeted at the many immigrants residing in the country, especially the Burkinabe's, who formed a greater percentage of foreigners in Cote d'Ivoire. The Ivoirite policy rendered citizens who were not indigenous Ivorians ineligible for presidency.

Prior to this, Ivory Coast was a beacon of stability and development in the very chaotic sub-region. However, the 'segregationist' policy polarized the country and resulted in social unease, contrary to what Bedie expected. Consequently, Bedie's administration was overthrown in a coup d'état in 1999 - the country's first unconstitutional change of government (Cook, 2011). However, General Robert Guei, the leader of the junta, did not immediately restore democracy in the country, hence resulting in a mass revolt which led to Laurent Gbagbo taking over as president (Momodu, 2018). At this time, the stability in the country had been compromised, hence paving way for future unrest. Due to this, an attempt to topple Gbagbo's regime in 2002 resulted in a civil war. The conflict led to the northern territory being controlled by rebel groups and the south by the government. The international community employed diplomacy as a mechanism for resolving the conflict. In all, about ten peace agreements were reached (Momodu, 2018). The Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Côte d'Ivoire (PAPP) and the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (OPA) signed in 2005 and 2007 respectively were instrumental towards resolving the conflict.

In addressing the citizenship quandary, the OPA resolved to permit Ouattara to contest elections although the constitution prohibited individuals with a non-Ivorian ancestry from contesting elections. The poll was however postponed five times in six years (Abatan, 2016). Despite the delays, a significant aspect of the peace pact that aimed at disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating (DDR) combatants was not completely achieved before the 2010 elections, due to the lack of trust among the factions (Ramis, 2011). A ceremonial DDR was however held under the auspices of external partners. That notwithstanding, both factions ‘continued to rearm’ ahead of the election (ibid). Despite this and other logistical challenges encountered, the election was not postponed for the seventh time. The poll was contested by Gbagbo, Ouattara and Bedie, among eleven other candidates. The first round of elections held on 31 October 2010 was successful and occurred within a relatively stable and peaceful condition. In this regard, international observers lauded the election as being free and fair (Doyle, 2010). At the end of the poll, none of the fourteen candidates won an outright majority. However, Gbagbo was in the lead with 38.3% of the votes. The voting was however greatly influenced by ethnic, religious and regional affiliations (Novosseloff, 2018). Ahead of the runoff election, Bedie campaigned and vehemently supported Ouattara, hence limiting Gbagbo’s chances of winning (BBC, 2019).

After the 28 November run-off election, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) declared Ouattara as winner, having garnered 54% of the votes against Gbagbo who accumulated 46% of the total votes. The result was upheld by the international community including ECOWAS, EU, AU and the UN (Simonen, 2012). Discontented with the outcome, Gbagbo asserted that the election was rigged. In view of this, he petitioned the Constitutional Council, which subsequently annulled over 600,000 of the votes, mostly from Ouattara’s stronghold. The court then declared Gbagbo as the legitimate winner of the poll (Cocks, T & Kpodo, K 2011). The ruling was condemned by the international community as it was perceived as an attempt by the incumbent to illegitimately cling to power and subvert the will of the people. The stalemate emanating from the dispute plunged the already volatile country into another round of violence and fighting, leading to many casualties and the displacement of thousands. The combat was spearheaded by Gbagbo’s supporters against the followers of Ouattara. The latter on the other hand aligned himself with the Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire, former combatants in the first civil war (Kode, 2016).

As the fighting ensued, Gbagbo ordered the French and UN peacekeepers to evacuate the country and further banned their aircrafts from flying through the airspace of Ivory Coast (Watt,

2011). The UN forces however flaunted the order. By March 2011, the country was at the brink of experiencing another civil war. Towards the end of March, pro-Ouattara forces launched military attacks across the country, in an attempt to topple Gbagbo. That notwithstanding, this did not deter Gbagbo from relinquishing power. In early April 2011, pro-Gbagbo forces indiscriminately attacked UN troops in Abidjan, triggering a response from the international force. Due to the hostilities, UN forces, acting under security council mandate to prevent the use of heavy weapons against civilians launched a military offensive against Gbagbo's troops (BBC, 2019). This however did not dissuade Gbagbo's militia from carrying out attacks against civilians and other stakeholders in the conflict. The conflict culminated on 11 April 2011, when pro-Ouattara forces aided by French troops arrested Gbagbo.

5.3 The role of international actors in the crisis

From the onset of the first civil war, the international community had been committed to ensuring a successful democratic transition in Cote d'Ivoire. Beyond ECOWAS, other regional organizations such as the EU and AU as well as the UN and France were actively involved in the conduct of the elections and the aftermath crisis that emerged. The interest of the international community in the crisis is attributable to the fact that, prior to 2010, the country had experienced a civil war, hence making it imperative for the international community to prevent the outbreak of another conflict. Again, with the country still polarized along ethnic and religious lines, it was necessary that international organizations intervened as early as possible in order to prevent the occurrence of a possible genocide. Perhaps, this was as a result of lessons learnt from the 1994 Rwandan genocide where the international community blatantly ignored the plight of civilians in the East African country. As such, the role of the international community in resolving the conflict cannot be underestimated. Arguably, the conflict would have prolonged and resulted in an incalculable humanitarian crisis had international actors not responded swiftly.

5.3.1 ECOWAS

On its part, ECOWAS swiftly accepted the results declared by IEC, hence legitimising Ouattara's victory. This approach by the sub-regional organization was criticized initially by Thabo Mbeki, the lead mediator for the AU (Obi, 2011). The position of the sub-regional organization presupposed that the election was free, fair and without irregularities. However, it was common knowledge that the election was flawed to some extent due to the initial challenges encountered by IEC (Kode, 2016). Based on the flaws in the electoral process, ECOWAS should have been opened to embracing any grievances expressed by the contestants

in order to ascertain the best possible way to resolve it. Gbagbo's recommendation for a recount of the ballot papers was quickly dismissed by ECOWAS (Cook, 2011). It was due to this that ECOWAS was perceived as biased, hence making Gbagbo intransigent to their demands. The lack of neutrality appears to be a common trend in ECOWAS' conflict management approach. In Liberia, ECOWAS similarly disregarded the proposals of Taylor, hence unduly prolonging the conflict as discussed in chapter four.

Moreover, with ECOWAS and its partners condemning the decision of the court, it undermined the credibility of the judicial system as well as the constitution of Ivory Coast. The challenge emanating from the stance of ECOWAS pertains to which institutions have the legitimate authority to pronounce victors and losers of elections. Did the position of the international community superintend over the decision of the court? At a glance, it appears that the position of the international community was appropriate in safeguarding the countries democracy. However, a deeper analysis of the issue exposes the challenges that this approach poses to democracy, especially due to the precedence it sets in Africa.

That notwithstanding, the prompt response of ECOWAS reflects the organizations keen interest in ensuring that democratic values are upheld and respected by member states. It further exhibits the sub-regional organizations quest to prevent Ivory Coast from resurging into conflict and an attempt to climax its conflict management in the country. The decision of ECOWAS also evinced impeccable leadership in a region where 'presidential solidarity' usually overrides the 'will and aspirations of citizens' (Zounmenou, 2011).

5.3.2 African Union

The African Union on its part endorsed the position of ECOWAS, albeit, after the outcome of the election had been probed by the continental organization. The initial response of the AU was to initiate mediation processes to resolve the conflict. The approach was however unsuccessful (Ramis, 2011). The failure of the AU mediation efforts can be attributed to the inability of the organization to identify the right person to lead its 'diplomatic engagements' (Kode, 2016). On his part, Mbeki acting as the mediator for the AU returned from Abidjan only calling for peace whereas Raila Odinga had stated prior to his appointment as mediator that Gbagbo must be forced to relinquish power, hence tainting his reputation as a neutral mediator.

Later in February 2011, the Peace and Security Council of AU created an ad hoc high-level panel headed by the president of Mauritania, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, to find a political solution to the crisis (Cocks T & Kpodo, K 2011). Members of the committee included the

presidents of Chad, Burkina Faso, South Africa and Tanzania. The panel proposed four measures to resolve the conflict. These included, 'support for a national unity government headed by Ouattara', the assurance of a dignified exit for Gbagbo; restructuring of some state institutions including the military, electoral commission and the constitutional council as well as the establishment of a truth, justice and reconciliation commission (Cook, 2011). A communique published by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) reaffirmed the organizations stance on the need for a political resolution to the crisis (AU, 2011). The council also requested for the appointment of a high representative to superintend over the implementation of the mechanisms adopted to resolve the crisis. As well as a two weeks' timeframe during which parties to the conflict would develop 'modalities for the implementation of the proposals' (ibid). Due to the unwavering posture of parties to the conflict, especially Gbagbo and his cronies, the enforcement of the AU resolution was adversely hindered.

Although the proposals from the panel of five were very relevant and necessary for resolving the crisis, nonetheless, the AU's inclination to the formation of a unity government appears to show the organizations wavering support for Ouattara. Unsurprisingly, the organizations posture was only a reflection of its tradition of proposing for a unity government in most disputed elections that threatens peace on the continent. Prior to the post-election violence in Ivory Coast, the AU's 'one size fit all' recommendation had been presented to Kenya and Zimbabwe, where the strategy failed. Perhaps, this reflects the solidarity among some heads of states of the continental body towards Gbagbo. Again, the AU did not make a backup plan in case the diplomatic approach it adopted failed. This is due to the lack of capacity on the part of the organization to resort to military intervention as a means of ending the massacre. It is noteworthy that, the recommendations proposed by the organization could only be implemented after the intransigent Gbagbo had been forcefully removed from office (Ramis, 2011).

5.3.3 United Nations

The UN played a significant, if not leading role, in the resolution of the conflict. The United Nations' Operations in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) had been involved in peacekeeping activities in the West African country since 2004 (Simonen, 2012). UNOCI had a unique mandate of certifying the outcome of the 2010 elections as stipulated in security council resolution 1603 of 2005 (Novosseloff, 2018). Although UNOCI was mandated to certify the elections, it had no responsibility or so ever in the organization of the poll. Thus, it only played the role of a

certifier and not an actor in the elections (Doyle, 2010). UNOCI's role was geared towards 'guaranteeing the credibility of the elections' in terms of the electoral process as well as the outcome of the poll (ibid). In other words, UNOCI's responsibility was to ensure that the loser of the election accepts defeat (Watt, 2011). With the UN leading the certification process, it was anticipated that the outcome of the election would not be disputed. This however turned out to be an illusion as the UN-certified results was contested by Gbagbo. As stated earlier, the controversy emanating from international organizations validating or invalidating the outcome of an election has to do with whether the position of these organizations supersedes the decisions of state institutions. It is in view of this that Gbagbo fiercely resisted the operations of UNOCI as he classified it as the culmination of an imperialist agenda against Cote d'Ivoire (ibid).

Most peace agreements facilitated by the UN in countries experiencing conflicts are usually focused on realizing a transition to democracy. The flaw with this strategy is that, elections are usually envisioned as a means to end conflicts. This notion fails to recognize that election is only a means to an end and not an end in itself. As such, elections may be necessary but not a sufficient condition for realizing a lasting peace. With regards to the Ivorian context, the UN and the other international organizations involved in the peace processes were oblivious of the need for a post-election deal that would be satisfactory to all parties to the conflict (Zounmenou, 2011). In view of this, the 'winner takes all' approach adopted prior to the elections made it almost impossible for the post-election crisis to be avoided (Cook, 2011). That notwithstanding, the use of force by UNOCI in collaboration with the French troops contributed immensely towards preventing the crisis from escalating and ultimately restored law and order to the country.

5.3.3 France

Due to the many constraints UNOCI was confronted with, Paris became an indispensable actor in resolving the conflict. In April 2011, French troops, acting under the banner of Operation Lincolne were dispatched to Ivory Coast to assist UNOCI (UNSC, 2011). France's involvement in conflicts in Africa, especially among the Francophone states is nothing new. Paris' engagement with its formal colonies is influenced and sustained by the historical, linguistic, cultural and economic ties that exist between Paris and its formal colonies (ACLED, 2015). Prior to 2010, French military personnel had been deployed to Ivory Coast in 2002, based on a bilateral agreement between the two countries (Okyere, 2014). However, as the post-election crisis loomed, the UN Secretary General requested for Lincolne to aid UNOCI in

carrying out its mandate (Kode, 2016). The UNSC authorization therefore formed the legal basis for the involvement of France in the conflict.

Despite the UN mandate, France justified its interest in the Ivorian crisis on the basis of protecting its citizens and foreign nationals in the war-torn country (Abatan, 2016). Besides this, France also endeavoured to protect its economic as well as strategic interest against Gbagbo and his Young Patriots who had openly opposed the involvement of France in the conflict (Zounmenou, 2011). That notwithstanding, Lincolne did not have the mandate to either undertake or support a regime change. This renders Paris' involvement in the arrest of Gbagbo problematic and contentious. Also, this reaffirms Gbagbo's initial postulation that the presence of France in the West African country was to further its neo-imperialist agenda. Critics argue that, France leveraged its permanent position on the UNSC to intervene in Ivory Coast in order to achieve an outcome that would be favourable to its national interest (Okoyere, 2014). The extension of the activities of Operation Lincolne beyond its UNSC mandate blurs the line between protecting civilians and regime change (ibid). This affirmed the partiality of UNOCI and France in resolving the conflict. However, this misdemeanour eluded the attention of the international community as the concern of all external actors was to ensure that Gbagbo receded power. Nevertheless, Lincolne contributed significantly towards protecting civilians and controlling the usage of heavy weapons at a time where security was rapidly deteriorating in Cote d'Ivoire.

5.4 The ECOWAS Conflict Management Approach

The resurgence of violence in Ivory Coast posed a threat to the region's peace and security in many ways. The spill-over effect of the conflict could have created a refugee crisis in the sub-region and further threatened the brittle peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire's neighbouring states (Abatan, 2016). Again, to allow Gbagbo to circumvent the will of the people, expressed through elections, would have set a precedence that would have undermined democracy in the sub-region, as well as the ECOWAS security architecture. It is based on these reasons that the ECOWAS intervention was necessary. As the crisis evolved, ECOWAS was confronted with two major challenges. The first had to do with how the regional organization could develop and pursue a cohesive approach. The second related to how ECOWAS could garner the needed resources to aid the resolution of the conflict (Yabi, 2012).

The immediate response of ECOWAS to the crisis was to call for an extraordinary session on 7 December 2010, where a decision was taken to suspend Cote d'Ivoire from all ECOWAS decision making bodies as well as meetings. To assess later developments in the political and

security situation, another Extraordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of States and Governments was convened in Abuja on 24 December 2010. At this meeting, the regional bloc reiterated its non-negotiable position on the status of Ouattara as the legitimate President of Cote d'Ivoire, with reference to the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. In view of this, 'ECOWAS demanded the immediate and peaceful handover of power by Gbagbo to Ouattara, in accordance with the expressed wishes of the Ivorian people' (ECOWAS, 2010). ECOWAS further appointed the presidents of Cape Verde, Benin, Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone to lead the diplomatic efforts of the organization (Simonen, 2012). Added to the above, ECOWAS expressed support for sanctions imposed on Gbagbo which included travel ban, freeze on financial assets and all other forms of targeted sanctions imposed by regional institutions on the out-going president and his associates. The Central Bank of West African States was authorized to block Gbagbo's access to Cote d'Ivoire's funds, as a way of making it difficult for the government to pay soldiers and public servants (Odobu S.O., et.al, 2016). ECOWAS also threatened to use legitimate force to ensure that the will of the Ivorian people is respected.

Although ECOWAS did not intervene militarily, yet its involvement in the crisis was fraught with many challenges. Notable among these challenges had to do with the involvement of other international institutions in the conflict resolution process. The involvement of different multinational organizations in a conflict though helpful, yet could stifle the resolution of the crisis if there is a lack of coordination among the distinct actors (Novosseloff, 2018). Primarily, this challenge emanates from the overlapping responsibility of all intergovernmental organizations to contribute towards the furtherance of international peace and security (Yabi, 2012). Furthermore, there is a lack of clearly established norm that stipulates the responsibility and the kind of interaction that must exist between sub-regional, continental and global organizations in any given conflict (ibid). Unarguably, the UN, AU and ECOWAS all have a legal and moral obligation to ensure the sub-region's stability and peace. However, with the lack of a clear-cut delineation of responsibilities, confusion became inevitable in the execution of their mandates.

The collaboration between AU and ECOWAS for instance was hindered in a number of ways. As stated earlier, the response of ECOWAS after the November round-off election was clear, Gbagbo had lost and as such needed to relinquish power immediately. However, the AU approached the endorsement of the results in a different manner. The position of the AU was unclear until the high-level panel submitted its findings to the PSC in March 2011. This

approach perhaps urged Gbagbo on, as he envisioned the possibility of a different response from the continental organization, hence his clinging to power until he was forcefully ousted. Also, the AU's recommendation for the formation of a unity government contradicted the unflinching position of ECOWAS. The role of ECOWAS in the peace processes was also constricted as it was dependent on the finalization of the report of the AU high panel (Odobol, S. O, et.al 2016). As such, the delays in the report unduly impinged the efforts of the West African bloc in managing the crisis.

Again, the longstanding geo-political rivalry between the two 'self-acclaimed hegemons' on the continent, South Africa and Nigeria, was reignited on the question of which country should take the lead role in resolving the crisis (Obi, 2011). Prior to this, Nigeria had been instrumental in the management of conflicts in the sub-region. Had the AU and its international partners reclined from the crisis, Nigeria was likely to have taken the lead role as it has always done in resolving conflicts in West Africa. Yabi (2012) argues that, the contention was evident in the January 2011 AU summit held in Addis Ababa where tension mounted between the West African side headed by Nigeria, Senegal and Burkina Faso and the Southern African side headed by South Africa and Angola. Contrary to Nigeria's position that Gbagbo lost the election, South Africa seem to have taken a favourable approach towards Gbagbo hence influencing the AU's proposal for power-sharing between the candidates (Ramis, 2011). Further, ECOWAS lambasted South Africa for subverting its efforts by positioning a warship outside Abidjan to support Gbagbo, should the sub-regional bloc decide to forcefully remove him from power (Okyere, 2014). Although this allegation was denied by the South African government, yet the suspicion adversely affected the relations between ECOWAS and AU.

Moreover, the ECOWAS peace and security architecture developed after the Liberian civil war sought to enhance the organization's capacity to prevent the occurrence of conflicts. Thus, the mechanism for conflict prevention and resolution was geared towards making the organization proactive rather than reactive to conflicts occurring within the region. With the unstable nature of security in Ivory Coast prior to the elections and especially due to the lackadaisical approach of the warring factions towards disarming, ECOWAS should have anticipated the possibility of recurrence of violence in the country. Post-election violence is not a new phenomenon in African politics. According to the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), post-election violence occurs between 19% to 25% of all elections held on the African continent (Abatan, 2016). With the high level of polarization persisting after the first

civil war and the entrenched position of all the contestants towards winning the poll, ECOWAS had enough reasons to anticipate the possibility of violence in order to prevent its occurrence.

However, no preventive measures were put in place to ensure that the regional organization could swiftly intervene should the outcome of the results get disputed. Particularly, the crisis served as a test for the newly adopted ECPF. As discussed in chapter three, the framework provided for the council of the wise to be actively engaged in the mediation of potential conflicts. Yet, during the crisis, a greater part of the mediatory role was undertaken by the Authority. This study argues that, the council of the wise could have contributed significantly towards mediating the conflict since the Authority was divided on the best approach to resolving the crisis. Again, since Gbagbo perceived the involvement of the international community, especially the UN and France as pursuing imperialist agenda, an Afrocentric approach may have been welcomed by him, hence necessitating the need for the council of the wise to have been involved in the process. The inability of ECOWAS to successfully resolve the crisis therefore reflects the incapacity of the organization to operationalize its robust conflict prevention and resolution policies adopted prior to the crisis.

5.4.1 Military intervention- desirable but impractical

Based on article 22 of the Mechanism, the Authority of Heads of State and Government requested for the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff to consider the viability of a military intervention to depose Gbagbo (Obi, 2011). The meeting of the defence chiefs however revealed that a military operation by the standby force 'was not operationally feasible' (ibid). That notwithstanding, most countries within the sub-region vehemently opposed the resort to military intervention to end the conflict (Yabi, 2012). Although military intervention had become necessary in resolving the impasse, member states of the community had different perspectives on the use of force to champion a pro-democracy agenda. This was however to be expected as member states of the community rarely arrive at a unanimous decision on military interventions, as evidenced in the controversies surrounding the deployment of ECOMOG to Liberia.

Member states that took the anti-military stance argued that a military intervention might cause Gbagbo to retaliate by attacking foreign nationals in Abidjan (Kode, 2016). With Cote d'Ivoire being home to many West African foreigners, member states of the community were more inclined towards preserving their national interest and the security of their nationals. This is a reflection of a deep-seated challenge regarding the lack of political will by member states to commit entirely to ensuring regional stability. Again, member states feared that the use of force

in reconciling electoral disputes may set an undesirable precedence for future military intervention in the many contested elections in the sub-region (Odobó, S. O et.al 2016). In view of this, some countries preferred the diplomatic approach although it was quite clear that Gbagbo was not prepared to willingly yield power if force was not applied.

Whereas Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Senegal championed the use of force in resolving the stalemate, Ghana, Gambia, Togo and Benin took a neutral stand (Watt, 2011). Ghana's president at the time, John Atta Mills, emphatically stated that Accra would not support any form of military intervention as it was not the appropriate means to resolve the crisis (Cocks, T & Kpodo, K, 2011). This position was influenced by Accra's quest to ensure the safety of its citizens in Cote d'Ivoire as well as constraints on the military capability of Ghana, hence making it impossible for the country to contribute troops towards the ECOWAS standby force (ibid). Nigeria on the other hand was confronted with many internal security challenges that it was grappling with, especially the Boko Haram insurgency (Cook, 2011). Also, Abuja had an upcoming election in 2011 and considering the many unresolved domestic challenges, the use of the countries scarce resources and troops to support the intervention would have been politically costly to the incumbent government (Doyle, 2010). The unwillingness of Nigeria to spearhead ECOWAS' military intervention in Cote d'Ivoire reaffirms the fact that ECOWAS is seemingly unable to perform its role of ensuring peace and security in the sub-region without the involvement of the regional leader (Odobó, S. O, etal, 2016). Significantly, the stance of the member states of the region reflects a significant shift in the Anglo-Francophone rivalry that always permeated the sub-region's conflict resolution strategies. However, it reaffirms how personal and national interest always takes precedence over sub-regional interest in the organizations conflict management efforts.

Further, with the loyalty of the Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire tilted towards Gbagbo, a regional intervention risked further escalating the conflict and perhaps prolonging it. In order to avoid this, ECOWAS refrained from intervening (El-Khawas, M & Anyu, J, 2014). This reason is however not a sufficient explanation for ECOWAS' inability to deploy troops into Ivory Coast. In March 2011, ECOWAS requested for the UN Security Council to strengthen the mandate of UNOCI, implying that the organization recognized the need for a military intervention but lacked the capacity to adopt that approach. The fundamental reason why ECOWAS refrained from deploying troops into Ivory Coast was because it lacked the needed logistical, institutional and financial capability to make its intervention successful (Doyle, 2010). It is in view of this,

that ECOWAS had to rely on UNOCI and France to carry out the much-needed military intervention that ended the crisis.

Yabi (2012) and Zoumenou (2011) argue that, the inability of ECOWAS to adhere to the organization's conflict framework that provided for the use of force to oust Gbagbo is an embarrassment to the organization. This study however asserts that, such a supposition may be true on the surface value. However, considering the complexity of the conflict and the many challenges faced by the sub-regional organization, it acted prudently by requesting for the UNSC to strengthen the mandate of UNOCI. That notwithstanding, it only reflects the many limitations in the institutional capacity of ECOWAS to deal with security challenges emerging within the community.

5.5 Conclusion

During the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, the regional bloc barely had established institutions and structures to address the crisis. This posed a central challenge to the conflict management of the organization. However, the post-election crisis in Cote d'Ivoire presented a unique set of challenges to the regional organization. Although the option to use force in ousting Gbagbo was permissible under the organization's legal statutes, yet it was not a feasible alternative due to ECOWAS' lack of operational capacity. Unlike previous conflicts in the sub-region where ECOWAS had been at the forefront of the resolution process, the organization had to partner with UNOCI, France and the AU in resolving the Ivorian crisis. Some challenges explored in this chapter includes the lack of coordination between ECOWAS and its partners, the inability of ECOWAS to operationalize its conflict management policies and the lack of consensus on the deployment of the ECOWAS stand-by force.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

Over the past three decades, ECOWAS has been actively involved in maintaining peace and security in West Africa. In view of the region's precarious security conditions, the organization has revamped its efforts at stabilizing the community in recent times. After a rather daunting and prolonged presence of ECOMOG in Liberia, the sub-regional organization least expected that Cote d'Ivoire- the epitome of development and stability in the community- would be plunged into conflict. Although ECOWAS could not apply force in Yamoussoukro due to its weak military capability at the time, yet, the organization was actively involved in searching for a lasting solution to the conflict. This chapter seeks to assess the findings of the research vis-à-vis the case studies discussed in the last two chapters. The other sections of the chapter will be concerned with recommendations for policy consideration as well as future research.

6.2 Summary of findings

The focus of the study has been to evaluate the challenges which undermined ECOWAS' interventions in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire. In this regard, the thesis has not been concerned with whether or not the interventions were successful or a failure as these terms are complex and subjective, hence the narrow focus on challenges. Analysing the impediments ECOWAS was confronted with is significant as it brings to light some challenges that are recurrent in the organization's conflict management efforts. As such, it is evident from the discussions in chapter four and five that some challenges encountered by ECOWAS in Liberia did recur in Cote d'Ivoire. However, the robust security architecture adopted by the regional organization after the intervention in Liberia contributed towards mitigating the challenges the organization encountered in Cote d'Ivoire, especially pertaining to the legality of the intervention. It is worthy to note that the new impediments emerging from the intervention in Cote d'Ivoire are likely to be replicated in future interventions if not adequately redressed by the organization.

The study reveals that the approach of ECOWAS member states towards conflicts in the sub-region has changed remarkably with time. In the early 1990's when ECOWAS was in the process of reshaping its scope from being primarily development oriented to embracing its new

role as the leading security actor in the sub-region, member states were actively involved in supporting conflicts within the community (Halistoprak, 2015). It is in view of this that Taylor's rebellion in Liberia received support from some West African states, hence endangering the initiatives of the regional organization towards resolving the conflict. However, this has changed with time. In view of this, the Ivorian conflict was unanimously condemned by the community (El-Khawas, M & Anyu, J, 2014). The twist in response by member states reflects the gradual blurring of the Anglo-Francophone tensions which previously stifled the organizations conflict management capabilities.

Again, the dynamics of conflicts within the region has changed remarkably. This is attributable to the fact that protracted civil wars are on the decline in West Africa. Despite this, the sub-region is currently experiencing new security threats emanating from political violence and terrorism (Marc et.al, 2017). As such, the Ivorian crisis marked a new era of conflicts occurring within the sub-region. It is in view of this that although the Liberian civil war claimed the lives of over 200,000 people, the Ivorian conflict resulted in 3000 casualties (Kieh, 2004). Fundamentally, the causes of conflicts in the sub-region have not changed. Poverty, unemployment, human rights abuses and the lack of commitment to democratic principles are prevalent within the sub-region. However, in both conflicts, the source of contention can be attributed to the polarization of the country along ethnic lines. The conflict in Liberia was underpinned by the political and economic marginalization of the indigenous people. Similarly, the root cause of the first Ivorian civil war which precipitated the post-election conflict pertains to the instrumentalization of citizenship as a tool by the political elites to marginalize non-indigenous Ivorians in the governance process.

Moreover, the Liberian civil war was precipitated by bad governance which only alluded to the benefit of the elite few. The dissatisfaction thereof resulted in citizens supporting the ousting of the government (ibid). That notwithstanding, when ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy, it reflected the organizations attempt to learn from the Liberian experience in order to improve democracy within West Africa. Despite this commitment by member states, the consolidation of democracy in the sub-region seem far-fetched. Unsurprisingly, the lack of respect for democratic principles resulted in the Ivorian conflict. This exhibits a gap between the regional organizations policies and what is practiced in reality. Although Gbagbo was a signatory to the Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy, yet he refused to step down after losing the election. This is however not uncommon but reflects a

lack of commitment and political will of leaders of member states to adhere to the peace and security policies of ECOWAS.

Similarly, although the PMAD prohibited external interference in the internal affairs of member states, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire aided the NPFL insurrection in Liberia (Brown, 1999). This portrays a challenge with enforcing the sub-region's peace and security policies. The quintessential issue arising from this is that, the national interest of member states may always take precedence over the collective regional interest. This renders it practically difficult for member states to reach a consensus on the best approach to resolving conflicts occurring within the community, since they all prioritise the benefits they may accrue from supporting the organizations intervention efforts over regional peace.

Further, the capacity of ECOWAS to prevent and manage conflicts in the sub-region is overstretched. It is in view of this that the organization could not embark on a military intervention in Ivory Coast. It is also as a result of this that the intervention in Liberia was fraught with significant challenges that eventually prolonged the conflict (Tuck, 2000). The lack of adequate capacity to resolve conflicts usually results in ECOWAS compromising its neutrality in order to garner support from belligerents in a conflict. This phenomenon was evident in the intervention in Liberia where ECOWAS supported some rebel factions.

Another evolving development in conflict management in West Africa pertains to the shift in the approach of the international community towards conflicts within the sub-region. In recent times, West Africa has experienced a surge in the involvement of the international community in redressing security threats in the region. Although the UN intervened in the Liberian civil war, yet the organization only did so after ECOWAS had initiated diplomatic measures to end the conflict and deployed a peacekeeping mission to Monrovia (Adibe, 1997). This allowed ECOWAS to develop an Afrocentric approach towards resolving the conflict and also afforded the sub-regional organization the opportunity to take ownership of peace and stability within the region. Contrary to this, the resolution of the Ivorian civil war was dominated by the UN and France and to some extent the AU (Zounmenou, 2011). Although the role of these organizations in the conflict resolution process was significant in containing and ending the conflict, yet, it further complicated the conflict and stifled ECOWAS' engagement in the crisis. It is therefore imperative that ECOWAS develops a clear-cut strategy that delineates the role of international actors in conflicts occurring within West Africa.

Furthermore, the approach of ECOWAS towards the two conflicts differed in many respects. Upon the eruption of the Liberian civil war, it took ECOWAS eight months to intervene in the conflict. This is understandable as it was the first conflict occurring within the sub-region after the establishment of the organization. ECOWAS was also ill-prepared to intervene in the conflict (Adeleke, 1995). This can be attributed to the lack of institutional structures to guide the organizations efforts. Contrary to this, ECOWAS responded swiftly to the second Ivorian civil war. This is attributable to the existence of the ECOWAS peace and security architecture that ascribes the responsibility of maintaining regional peace and security to the bloc. It is in view of this that the involvement of ECOWAS in Ivory Coast was acceptable within the sub-region's legal framework. Whereas the intervention in Liberia was confronted with legal challenges based on international law and existing protocols of ECOWAS.

Also, there are similarities and differences in the challenges encountered by ECOWAS in managing both conflicts. Particularly, the controversial role of Nigeria as leader of the intervention in Liberia adversely affected the capacity of ECOWAS to mediate the conflict, as the organization was perceived as biased (Kennedy, 2018). That notwithstanding, the intervention would have failed had Nigeria refrained from taking responsibility for managing the conflict. However, with Nigeria lacking the capacity to marshal troops and the needed resources to support an ECOWAS intervention in Ivory Coast, the sub-regional bloc only pursued diplomatic processes although a military intervention was necessary. As such, Nigeria's role in the maintenance of regional peace cannot be underrated. That notwithstanding, Nigeria's involvement in conflicts within the sub-region is premised on Abuja's efforts at pursuing its national interest (Arowolo, 2015). It is in view of this that Abuja's economic and political ties with Liberia, as well as the many Nigerians trapped in Monrovia, influenced the formers decision to intervene. With these conditions not being entirely present in Cote d'Ivoire, coupled with Abuja's domestic challenges, Nigeria was demotivated from leading an ECOWAS military intervention.

Another challenge occurring in both conflicts was the lack of a common approach embraced by all member states of the community in resolving the crisis. The strategy adopted by ECOWAS in resolving the conflicts was influenced by the stance of the member states of the community. In both conflicts, the various leaders of the community were divided along the lines of those who favoured military intervention as well as the anti-interventionist. This reflects the lack of consensus among member states on the best approach to managing conflicts

within the sub-region. This usually hinders ECOWAS' capacity to respond promptly to emerging conflicts within the sub-region.

Further, the interventions in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire reflects ECOWAS' lack of capacity to unilaterally intervene and resolve conflicts in the sub-region. Unarguably, ECOWAS has demonstrated its willingness to prevent, manage and address the root causes of conflicts in the region. However, due to the lack of capacity in terms of finance, logistics and institutional structures, ECOWAS usually relies on other intergovernmental organizations and states for assistance. This is due to the poor economic conditions of member states, hence making it difficult for them to contribute towards ECOWAS' conflict management operations. This challenge stifled the response of the sub-regional grouping especially in the Ivorian crisis where it lacked the capacity to deploy troops into the country (Yabi, 2012). The lack of funds and logistics was also evident in the Liberian civil war, where some contingents went months without salaries, hence resulting in corruption and malpractices among some troops (Tarr, 1993).

6.3 Recommendations for policy consideration

Despite the enormous efforts of ECOWAS to stabilize the region, conflicts continue to recur within West Africa. That notwithstanding, ECOWAS has demonstrated the potential to create a conducive environment needed to enhance its vision of promoting economic integration and development. A stable West Africa is however unattainable if ECOWAS is unable to redress the current challenges it is confronted with in managing conflicts within the community. In view of this, the study proposes the following:

1. Most conflicts occurring in West Africa are preventable as the causes of the conflicts are known. As such, it is important that the capacity of ECOWARN to identify potential triggers of conflicts in West Africa is enhanced. This requires that all member states collaborate with the various zonal bureaux and make information readily available to improve the efficiency of the institution in preventing conflicts. Also, ECOWARN and other institutions responsible for conflict prevention must be adequately resourced as it is less costly preventing conflicts than managing them.
2. ECOWAS must endeavour to improve its mediatory efforts in order to erase the perception of bias affiliated with the organizations conflict management operations. This requires the training of mediators to enhance their understanding of the conflicts they intervene in. Mediators appointed by the organization should also be people of integrity and suitable for the particular conflict situation they are called to mediate. In

this regard, ECOWAS must endeavour to be neutral and objective in its response to conflicts in the sub-region.

3. Rather than dispatching troops for peacekeeping operations in West Africa, the UN, AU and other state actors must endeavour to support the ECOWAS Standby force. Since ECOWAS is in a better position to dispatch troops to member states within the shortest possible time, it is relevant that the later provides logistical and financial support to aid peacekeeping operations in the sub-region instead of mobilizing troops for military intervention. This collaboration will enhance the capacity of ECOWAS in managing conflicts in the sub-region while contributing towards UN's vision of ensuring international peace and security. The UN and AU should however remain involved in mediating conflicts in the sub-region. This will resolve the challenge arising from overlapping roles of external actors in conflicts occurring in the sub-region.
4. In order to ensure timely military interventions, it is necessary that the capability of the ECOWAS Standby Force is enhanced. This require that the multinational force is equipped in terms of logistics and funds. In achieving this, the regional organization should create a special fund to support its peacekeeping operations. Member states must endeavour to contribute financially towards this end. Further, there must be a monitoring mechanism in place to evaluate the activities of troops dispatched by ECOWAS. This will ensure that military personnel act according to the ethical standards of their profession and do not engage in human right abuses and other malpractices.
5. Again, the ECOWAS Commission must periodically assess the performance of the organization after every intervention. This will enhance the capacity of the organization to learn from its interventions.
6. Further, ECOWAS must continue to support its member states in their democratization and development process. This requires that the current focus on election monitoring is broadened to include a focus on human rights, rule of law, equitable distribution of resources and youth empowerment among others. This should be done, albeit, within the existing legal framework of the organization in order not to undermine the sovereignty of member states.

6.4 Recommendations for future research

The study was focused on evaluating the impediments encountered by ECOWAS in its conflict management in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire. The study however identifies that there is a gap in the literature on ECOWAS' peacebuilding initiatives in West Africa. As such, it is crucial that future studies focus on the best approach the sub-regional organization can adopt in order to achieve positive peace after the organization ends its peacekeeping operations. Studies on ECOWAS' peacebuilding efforts have become increasingly necessary due to the high risk of recurrence of conflicts in most countries experiencing civil wars in West Africa. A case in point is Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire and the ongoing turmoil in Mali. In this regard, future studies on the role of ECOWAS in ensuring an Afrocentric peacebuilding is relevant in bridging the existing gap in literature. Such a study will contribute towards preventing countries that have experienced conflicts in West Africa from relapsing into war.

Bibliography

Abatan, E., 2016. African Solutions to African Problems? The AU, R2P and Côte d'Ivoire. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 23(1), pp. 21-38.

ACLED, 2015. *REAL-TIME ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE, APRIL 2015*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.strausscenter.org/armed-conflict-publications?download...conflict-trends...> [Accessed 7 5 2019].

Adebajo, A., 2002. *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau*. 1 ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,.

Adeleke, A., 1995. The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The Ecomog Operation in Liberia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 33(4), pp. 569-593.

Adeniji, O., 1997. Mechanisms for Conflict Management in West Africa: Politics of Harmonization. *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, pp. 1-10.

Adibe, C. E., 1997. The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership. *Third World Quarterly*, 18(3), pp. 471-488.

Afolabi, B. T., 2016. *THE ECOWAS CONFLICT PREVENTION FRAMEWORK (ECPF): EVOLUTION, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.osiwa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/THE-ECOWAS-CONFLICT-PREVENTION-FRAMEWORK.pdf> [Accessed 26 2 2019].

Afolabi, B. T., 2017. *The Politics of Peacemaking in Africa: Non-State Actors' Role in the Liberian Civil War*. Boydell and Brewer ed. New York: International Food Policy Research Institute.

Africa, U. N. E. C. f., 2018. *United Nations Economic Commission for Africa*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/ecowas-peace-security-stability-and-governance> [Accessed 26 June 2018].

Akpokpari, J., 2008. 'You Don't Belong Here' Citizenship, the State & Africa's Conflicts: Reflections on Ivory Coast. In: A. N. & P. T. Zeleza, ed. *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Cost*. Addis Ababa: OSSREA, pp. 88-105.

Alao, A., 2007. *Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment*. 1 ed. Rochester: Boydell & Brewer, University of Rochester Press.

Aning, E. K., 2004. Investing in peace and security in Africa: the case of ECOWAS. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 4(3), pp. 533-542.

Annan, N., 2014. Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges and Prospects. *International Journal of Security & Development*, 3(1), pp. 1-16.

Aremu, J. O., 2010. Conflicts in Africa: Meaning, Causes, Impact and Solution. *African Research Review*, 4(4), pp. 549-560.

Arowolo, D. E., 2015. Nigerian Foreign Policy and the Liberian Crisis: Interrogating the Nigeria's Interventionist Approach. *Journal of Public Policy and Governance*, 2(1), pp. 9-16.

- Atuobi, S., 2010. *Implementing the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention: Framework: prospects and challenges*, Accra: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre.
- AU, 2011. *COMMUNIQUE OF THE 265th MEETING OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL*. [Online]
Available at: www.peaceau.org/.../communique-of-the-265th-meeting-of-the-peace-and-security-c..
[Accessed 22 3 2019].
- BBC, 2019. *Ivory Coast country profile*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13287216>
[Accessed 21 3 2019].
- Bøås, M., 2010. The liberian civil war: new war/old war?. *Global Society*, 19(1), pp. 73-88.
- Brown, N. E., 1999. *ECOWAS and the Liberia Experience: Peacekeeping and Self Preservation*, New York: US Department of State.
- Bujra, A., 2002. *African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political and Social Environment*. Ethiopia: Development Policy Management Forum .
- Chuka, E., 2016. Regional International Organizations as Conflict Managers: The Limits and Capabilities. *African Research Review: An International Multi-disciplinary Journal*, 10(2), pp. 1-15.
- COMMISSION, E., 1993. *ECOWAS REVISED TREATY*. 1st Edition ed. Abuja: ECOWAS COMMISSION.
- Cook, N., 2011. *Cote d'Ivoire's Post-Election Crisis*, Washington: Congressional Research Service.
- Cowell, F., 2011. THE IMPACT OF THE ECOWAS PROTOCOL ON GOOD GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY. *African Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 19(2), p. 331–342.
- Development, D. f. I., 2000. *The causes of conflict in Africa*, London: British Government.
- Doyle, M., 2010. *No rush to military intervention in Ivory Coast*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12096437>
[Accessed 26 3 2019].
- ECOWAS, 1986. *ECOWAS Documentation online*. [Online]
Available at:
www.operationspaix.net/.../3827~v~Protocole d Assistance Mutuelle en matiere de..
[Accessed 18 02 2019].
- ECOWAS, 1991. *Declaration of Political Principles of the ECOWAS (A/DCL.1/7/91) Abuja, 4 - 6 July 1991 (Excerpts)*. [Online]
Available at:
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/CompilationDemocracy/Pages/ECOWASDec.aspx>
[Accessed 23 2 2019].
- ECOWAS, 1993. *ECOWAS Revised Treaty*. 1 ed. Abuja: ECOWAS Commission .
- ECOWAS, 1999. *PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT, RESOLUTION, PEACE-KEEPING AND SECURITY*. [Online]
Available at: https://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/.../ECOWAS_Protocol_ConflictPrevention.pdf
[Accessed 23 2 2018].
- ECOWAS, 2001. *ECOWAS Documentation Online: ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance*. [Online]

Available at: www.comm.ecowas.int/.../protocoles/Protocol%20on%20good-governance-and-demo. [Accessed 26 2 2019].

ECOWAS, 2008. *ECOWAS Documentation online: ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/.../ECOWAS-Conflict-Prevention-Framework.pdf> [Accessed 25 2 2019].

ECOWAS, 2013. *ECOWAS documentation online*. [Online] Available at: <http://documentation.ecowas.int/wpfb-file/protocol-relating-to-the-mechanism-for-conflict-prevention-management-resolution-peacekeeping-and-security-pdf/> [Accessed 27 11 2018].

ECOWAS, 2016. *ECOWAS- History*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/history/> [Accessed 5 4 2019].

ECOWAS, 2018. *Community Computer Centre*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/history/>

Ekiyor, T., 2008. ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF): A new approach to an old challenge.. *WACSI Op-Ed*, 1(6), pp. 1-15.

Ero, C., 1995. ECOWAS and the Subregional Peacekeeping in Liberia. *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 4(1), pp. 13-16.

Francis, D. J., 2017. *The Politics of Economic Regionalism: Sierra Leone in ECOWAS, Sierra Leone in ECOWAS*. 1st Edition ed. London : Routledge.

Frank Okyere & Samuel Atuobi, 2010. 'Enhancing the Operationalisation of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework: A Study on the State-Level Awareness of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework in West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Liberia and Ghana)', Accra: Kofi Anna International Peacekeeping Training Centre International Institutions Programme.

Gberie, L., 2003. ECOMOG: The Story of an Heroic Failure. *African Affairs*, 102(406), pp. 147-154.

Gberie, L., 2004. Reviewed Work: Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa by Adekeye Adebajo. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 38(2), pp. 425-427.

Ghali, B.-B., 1992. *UN Documents: Gathering a body of global agreements*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm> [Accessed 30 12 2018].

Halistoprak, B. T., 2015. The Role of Regional Organizations in Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Liberia Peacebuilding Operation and ECOWAS Intervention. *JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES RESEARCHES*, 1(35), pp. 1-22.

Hettne, B., 2008. Security Regionalism in Theory and Practice. In: B. H. e. al, ed. *Globalization and Environmental Challenges*. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 403-4012.

Howe, H., 1996. Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and regional peacekeeping. *International Security*, 21(3), pp. 145-176.

Hwang, K., 2006. *CHAPTER 2 CONCEPTUALISING POLITICO-SECURITY REGIONALISM*. [Online]
Available at: <https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/28223/02chapter2.pdf?sequence=3>
[Accessed 28 07 2018].

International Peace Academy, 1984. *International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper's Hand Book*. 1 ed.
New York: Pergamon Press.

Jackson, A., 2008. War, Violence and Peace in Africa. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 34(4), pp. 969-979 .

Jimoh, E. A., 2014. ECOWAS AND CHALLENGES OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN WEST AFRICAN STATES. *Sokoto Journal of the Social Sciences*, 4(2), pp. 7-16.

Kabia, J. M., 2011. *REGIONAL APPROACHES TO PEACEBUILDING: THE ECOWAS PEACE AND SECURITY: ARCHITECTURE*. Birmingham, African Agency in Peace, Conflict and Intervention.

Kaplan, R. D., 1994. The Coming Anarchy HOW SCARCITY, CRIME, OVERPOPULATION, TRIBALISM, AND DISEASE ARE RAPIDLY DESTROYING THE SOCIAL FABRIC OF OUR PLANET. *The Atlantic*, 273(2), pp. 44-76.

Kazanský, R., 2015. *The Theory of Conflicts*. 1 ed. Banská Bystrica: Publishing house of the Matej Bel University.

Kelechi Johnmary Ani & Lere Amusan, 2016. ECOWAS, peace and conflict management in West Africa. *Journal of African Foreign Affairs*, 3(1-2), pp. 19 - 32 .

Kennedy, E. C., 2018. *AN EVALUATION OF ECOWAS FIRST PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN WEST AFRICA: THE CHALLENGES OF ECOMOG MISSION IN LIBERIA*, Abuja: National Defence College .

Kieh, G. K., 2004. Irregular Warfare and Liberia's First Civil War. *Journal of International and Area Studies*, 11(1), pp. 57-77.

Kode, D., 2016. *The complexities of democracy-building in conflict-affected states: the role of ECOWAS and the African Union in Côte d'Ivoire*. 1 ed. Strömsborg: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

Kufour, K. O., 1993. The Legality of the Intervention in the Liberian Civil War by the Economic Community of West African States. *Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L*, 5(1), pp. 525- 560.

Labuda, P. I., 2015. *Oxford Public International Law: Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*. [Online]
Available at: <http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e364>
[Accessed 4 1 2019].

Maiangwa, B., 2017. Assessing the Responses of The Economic Community of West African States to the Recurring and Emerging Security Threats in West Africa. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 52(1), pp. 103-120.

Maiese, M., 2003. *Peacebuilding*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/peacebuilding>
[Accessed 4 1 2019].

- Marc et.al, 2017. Building Resilience to Conflict: The Case of West Africa . In: P. A. & C. A. Crocker, ed. *The Fabric of Peace in Africa: Looking beyond the State* . Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, pp. 301-320.
- Mareike, K., 2015. *E-International Relations*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/15/do-human-rights-challenge-state-sovereignty/>
[Accessed 3 4 2018].
- Mayer, B., 2000. *The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution: A Practitioner's Guide*. 1 ed. San Francisco: Jossey Bass Publishers.
- Melander, E., 2015. *The UCDP Armed Conflict Definition*, Uppsala: Uppsala University.
- Mohamed A. El-Khawas & Julius Ndumbe Anyu, 2014. Côte d'Ivoire: Ethnic Turmoil and Foreign Intervention. *Africa Today*, 61(2), pp. 41-55.
- Momodu, S., 2018. *First Ivorian Civil War (2002-2007)*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/first-ivorian-civil-war-2002-2007/>
[Accessed 19 3 2019].
- Novosseloff, A., 2018. *"The Many Lives of a Peacekeeping Mission: The UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire,"*. 1 ed. New York: International Peace Institute.
- Nwosu, J. C., 2014. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AN ORGANISATION. *Kuwait Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review*, 3(6), pp. 28-36.
- Oberschall, A., 1978. Theories of Social Conflict. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 4(1), pp. 291-315.
- Obi, C., 2011. *The Political Economy of Resources and Uneven African Development*. 1 ed. Morocco : Nordic Afrika Institute.
- Ofodile, A. C., 1994. The Legality of ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia. *Colum. J. Transnat'l L*, 1(32), pp. 381-405.
- Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W., 2007. Regional organizations and the resolution of internal conflict: The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. *International Peacekeeping*, 1(3), pp. 261-302.
- Okolo, J. E., 1983. Securing West Africa: The ECOWAS Defence Pact. *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 39(5), pp. 177-184.
- Okyere, F., 2014. The Mediation and Peace Process in Liberia: An Analysis of Experiences. In: S. Thompson, ed. *Mediating Conflict in West Africa: An Overview of Regional Experiences*. Accra: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, pp. 49-61.
- Okyere, M. A. & F., 2014. The Mediation and Peace Process in Liberia: An Analysis of Experiences and Challenges. In: S. Thompson, ed. *Mediating Conflict in West Africa*. Accra: Kof Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) and Crisis Management Initiative, pp. 73-83.
- Omeje, K., 2010. *Conflicts in West Africa*. [Online]
Available at: www.bundesheer.at/pdf.../sorting_out_the_mess_conflicts_west_africa_k_omeje.pdf
[Accessed 20 07 2018].
- Osiander, A., 2001. Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth. *International Organization*, 55(2), pp. 251-287.

- Ouellet, J., 2003. *Peacemaking*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/peacemaking>
[Accessed 3 1 2018].
- Peacebuilding, A. f., 2013. *Selected Definitions of Peacebuilding*. [Online]
Available at: <https://allianceforpeacebuilding.org/2013/08/selected-definitions-of-peacebuilding/>
[Accessed 14 12 2018].
- Pitts, M., 1999. Sub-Regional Solutions for African Conflict: The ECOMOG Experiment. *Journal of Conflict Studies*, 19(1), pp. 1-15.
- Ramis, N., 2011. *The intervention of the AU in the post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.icip-perlapau.cat/e-review/issue-11-december-2011/intervention-au-post-election-crisis-cote-divoire.htm>
[Accessed 22 3 2019].
- Rosenberg, E. S., 1985. The Invisible Protectorate: The United States, Liberia, and the Evolution of Neocolonialism, 1909–40. *Diplomatic History*, 9(3), pp. 191-214.
- Rugumamu, S. M., 2002. *Conflict Management in Africa: Diagnosis of Current Practices and Future Prospects*. [Online]
Available at: <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.472.5007&rep=rep1>.
[Accessed 11 12 2018].
- Sesay, M. A., 1996. Civil War and Collective Intervention in Liberia. *Review of African Political Economy*, 23(67), pp. 35-52.
- Sessay, M. A., 1996. Bringing pPeace to Liberia. *The International Review of Peace Initiatives*, 1(1), pp. 1-20.
- Simonen, K., 2012. *DOI*, 19(3), pp. 363-376.
- Sirleaf, E. J., 1991. The Causes and Consequences of the Liberian Civil War. *Harvard International Review*, 13(3), pp. 32-35.
- Solon, Gary Domke & Jenny Solon, 2018. *OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR: VOLUME IV , PEACE OPERATIONS*. [Online]
Available at: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_93-8_toc.htm
[Accessed 4 1 2019].
- Tarr, B., 1993. The ECOMOG Initiative in Liberia: A Liberian Perspective. *A Journal of Opinion*, 21(1/2), pp. 74-83.
- Tim Cocks & Kwasi Kpodo, 2011. *Ghana neutral on Ivory Coast, opposes force: president*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast/ghana-neutral-on-ivory-coast-opposes-force-president-idUSTRE6BU1ZX20110107>
[Accessed 26 3 2019].
- Tuck, C., 2000. Every Car Or Moving Object Gone"The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia.. *African Studies Quarterly*, 4(1), pp. 1-16.
- UN, 1945. *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*. 1 ed. New York: United Nations, Office of Public Information.

UN, 1970. *UN Documents: 2625 (XXV). Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations*. [Online]

Available at: <http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm>

[Accessed 8 3 2019].

UN, 1981. *UN Documents: Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States*. [Online]

Available at: <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r103.htm>

[Accessed 8 3 2019].

UN, 2008. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines*. 1 ed. New York: United Nations.

UN, 2016. *Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs*. [Online]

Available at: <http://legal.un.org/repertory/art52.shtml>

[Accessed 25 07 2018].

UN, 2018. *United Nations Peacekeeping*. [Online]

Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping>

[Accessed 13 12 2018].

UNSC, 2011. *Security Council Demands End to Violence in Cote d'Ivoire, Imposing Sanctions against Former President and Urging Him to 'Step Aside', in Resolution 1975*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10215.doc.htm>

[Accessed 22 3 2019].

Walraven, K. v., 1999. *Containing Conflicts in the Economic Community of West African States: Lessons from the Intervention in Liberia, 1990-1997*. 1 ed. Clingendel: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

Watt, N., 2011. *Ivory Coast's Laurent Gbagbo arrested – four months on*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/11/ivory-coast-former-leader-arrested>

[Accessed 21 3 2019].

Worldwide, K., 1970. Repulse of Raids by "Mercenaries" and Guinean Exiles. U.N. security Council Resolution. - Report by Special U.N. Mission. - Extraordinary Meeting of OAU Council of Ministers.. *Keesing's Record of World Events*, XVII(1), p. 24353.

Yabi, G., 2012. *Keeping the Peace in Electoral Conflicts: The Role of ECOWAS, UNOCI and the International Community in Côte d'Ivoire*, Berlin: Centre for International Peace Operations.

Zounmenou, D. D., 2011. *Confronting Complex Political Crisis in West Africa: An analysis of ECOWAS response to Niger and Cote D'Ivoire*, South Africa: ISS.